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Finally, for this thesis specifically, I am the sole author of the extended background and




Scaling anonymity networks offers unique security challenges, as attackers can exploit differing
views of the network’s topology to perform epistemic and route capture attacks. Anonymity net-
works in practice, such as Tor, have opted for security over scalability by requiring participants
to share a globally consistent view of all relays to prevent these kinds of attacks. Such an ap-
proach requires each user to maintain up-to-date information about every relay, causing the total
amount of data each user must download every epoch to scale linearly with the number of relays.
As the number of clients increases, more relays must be added to provide bandwidth, further
exacerbating the total load on the network.
In this work, we present Walking Onions, a set of protocols improving scalability for anony-
mity networks. Walking Onions enables constant-size scaling of the information each user must
download in every epoch, even as the number of relays in the network grows. Furthermore,
we show how relaxing the clients’ bandwidth growth from constant to logarithmic can enable
an outsized improvement to relays’ bandwidth costs. Notably, Walking Onions offers the same
security properties as current designs that require a globally consistent network view. We present
two protocol variants. The first requires minimal changes from current onion-routing systems.
The second presents a more significant design change, thereby reducing the latency required
to establish a path through the network while providing better forward secrecy than previous
such constructions. We evaluate Walking Onions against a generalized onion-routing anonymity
network and discuss tradeoffs among the approaches.
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When participants in an anonymity network hold different views of the network’s membership
and topology, an adversary can exploit these differences in knowledge to distinguish clients’
behaviours [DS08] or intercept users’ traffic [WMB10], allowing the attacker to gain sensitive
information about users’ activities, locations, or even identities. Anonymity networks in prac-
tice [DM20] have tried to stop these attacks by requiring all participants to share a global, con-
sistent view of the entire state of the network, and giving clients complete control over selecting
relays for their paths. While this approach prevents the described attacks, requiring a globally
consistent view severely limits scalability. As discussed by McLachlan et al. [MTHK09], the cost
of global knowledge scales quadratically: as the number of clients increases, the number of re-
lays must increase to provide more bandwidth, and all parties must download information about
all relays. Clearly, requiring global knowledge is an obstacle to the goal of growing anonymity
networks to reach the scale of modern-day browsers [Gab19].
In this work, we present novel protocols and algorithms to reduce the amount of data clients
must maintain in onion-routing anonymity networks from linear to constant relative to the num-
ber of relays. Thus, as the number of clients increases, the load to the network to distribute relay
information to clients increases linearly with the number of new relays, as opposed to quadrat-
ically. Notably, one protocol we present does not change the security model of Tor, while our
second protocol relaxes forward secrecy for path selection (but not for content) from immediate
to windowed in order to reduce client latency.
Our design uses a novel path-selection and circuit extension protocol called Walking Onions1
1The Walking Onion, or Allium× proliferum, is a charming edible plant that spreads by growing a cluster of new
bulbs on the top of its stalk, until the onion becomes so top-heavy that the bulbs flop over and take root somewhere
new.
1
in which clients obliviously choose random paths through the network without prior knowledge
about the network’s membership or topology, yet can verify the correctness of their paths after
they are constructed. In our first variant of Walking Onions, clients perform this oblivious relay
selection by randomly sampling an index from a distribution, and receive proof after the circuit
has been extended to verify that the new relay in their path corresponds to their random selec-
tion. Furthermore, the Walking Onions design can improve efficiency by using a technique from
Sphinx [DG09] to create circuits with only a single round trip between the client and all relays on
the path. This second variant of Walking Onions utilizes Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)
to perform this random sampling of indices at each intermediate relay, so that even though the
client does not perform this random sampling, they receive proof that the choice of relays was
in fact random and not influenced by intermediaries. This improvement reduces the latency of
circuit creation, as each circuit takes only a linear number of messages to construct, as opposed
to quadratic in onion routing networks today.
We verify that Walking Onions does in fact improve the scalability of Tor by simulating relay
and client bandwidth overhead, assessing the bandwidth costs of the Walking Onions protocols
against Tor’s existing onion routing protocol in a network setting comparable to Tor’s network
today. Our simulations demonstrate that even in a network the size of Tor today, relays in a Walk-
ing Onions setting save 4–6 times the bandwidth over Tor today, and in a network 10 times the
size of Tor, relays require 25–40 times less bandwidth. The savings for Tor clients in a Walking
Onions setting is even larger; clients in Walking Onions save 10–15 times the bandwidth over
clients in Tor today, and in a network 10 times the size of Tor, clients in Walking Onions re-
quire 90–150 times less bandwidth. Further, we demonstrate the CPU overhead of both Walking
Onions variants is either equal or only a slight increase to the CPU requirements of clients and
relays in Tor today.
We present several case studies demonstrating the applicability of Walking Onions to both
Tor [DMS04] as well as several other proposed anonymity network designs with similar threat
models and scalability concerns.
As such, this work aims to prove the following thesis statement:
It is possible to design an anonymity network whose clients maintain a constant amount
of network information even as the network grows, and can build circuits through the network
that require a linear number of messages relative to the length of the circuit. Furthermore, it
is possible that an anonymity network with such a design can remain secure against epistemic
and path-based attacks that previously have only been ameliorated by designs that require all
participants to retain a globally consistent view of the network.
2
1.1 Contributions
We present a novel set of efficient path-selection and circuit-extension protocols for anonymity
networks using onion routing. Our contributions include:
- Two novel protocols that require clients of an anonymity network to maintain only a
constant-sized amount of network information, while remaining secure against route cap-
ture and epistemic attacks (we describe these terms further in Chapter 2).
- Primitives to efficiently and verifiably transmit relay information, and a comparison of
several authentication mechanisms.
- Techniques and protocols to enable clients to constrain relay selection to a subset of relays
fulfilling some attribute, while not performing this filtering locally.
- Evaluation of these protocols’ bandwidth and CPU consumption in comparison to a gen-
eralized anonymity network modeled after Tor.
- An assessment of how these protocols perform on the Tor network today and at scale.
1.2 Organization
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review important con-
cepts that are useful to build understanding that is foundational to our work. In Chapter 3, we
review prior work in the literature and in practice that aims to address similar scalability and
security goals for anonymity networks as Walking Onions, and we discuss existing gaps in prior
work that Walking Onions should address. In Chapter 4, we discuss a high-level overview of
Walking Onions, including our assumed threat model, as well as the assumption of a network
authority. Furthermore, we review both scalability and security goals that Walking Onions is
designed to achieve. Furthermore, in this chapter, we discuss key insights that are important to
the construction and design of Walking Onions.
Next in this work, we present Walking Onions protocols in greater depth. In Chapter 5,
we introduce notation and terminology, and a mechanism for encoding and distributing network
information throughout an anonymity network implementing Walking Onions. We addition-
ally present a brief discussion on mechanisms to authenticate network directory documents. In
Chapter 6, we introduce two protocol variants in Walking Onions for path selection and circuit
construction, and discuss the tradeoffs of each when compared to the current Tor protocol. In
3
Chapter 7, we present several mechanisms for path selection to facilitate more complex relay
selection requirements.
The remainder of this work includes analysis of the effectiveness and generality of Walking
Onions. In Chapter 8, we present a performance analysis of Walking Onions as compared to a
Tor-like network, including evaluations for incurred bandwidth, CPU, and latency for both clients
and relays. In Chapter 9 we discuss alternative applications of Walking Onions to anonymity
network designs beyond Tor. Finally, we conclude and summarize main takeaways from this




In this chapter, we review concepts that will be useful throughout this work as background knowl-
edge to understand the set of Walking Onions protocols and algorithms we present in this work.
We begin by reviewing the use of onion routing for transmitting messages across anonymity net-
works, and provide an overview of the Tor network and protocols [DM20], one of the largest
and best-known onion-routing networks. We then discuss notable path-based attacks against
anonymity networks, which we later demonstrate Walking Onions to safeguard against. Finally,
we review cryptographic primitives and protocols which are used in Walking Onions. Specifi-
cally, we discuss Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) and their use in cryptographic sortition,
an operation that allows for members of a set to be verifiably sampled at random. Finally, as
Walking Onions requires distributing verifiable network information, the use of multi-party sig-
nature schemes is critical in some applications of Walking Onions to ensure distribution of trust
in anonymity networks. As such, we conclude with a thorough review of existing multi-party
joint signature schemes in the literature and discuss the benefits and tradeoffs among their de-
signs.
2.1 Onion Routing
The concept of Onion Routing was introduced by Goldschlag et al. [GRS96, RSG98] as an it-
erative method for clients to send information across a network anonymously while ensuring
that no intermediary relaying this information or network adversary observing the network can
either learn the content of the messages or link the sender and receiver of the messages purely by
bitwise analysis of the network messages. Such a use case is important in many real-world sce-
5
narios, such as when users wish to hide their web-browsing patterns from either a local internet
service provider or—as facilitated by the design of Tor—from the destination web server.
Onion routing uses a set of servers participating in the network (often called relays) to ex-
change messages wrapped in multiple layers of encryption. Appropriately, this message wrapped
with multiple layers of encryption is the onion, as each layer of encryption can be decrypted only
by a specific relay in the path through the network. Specifically, the message is encrypted multi-
ple times, once per each relay in the client’s path through the anonymity network. As each relay
receives this message, they strip off the layer of encryption that is encrypted to a key only they
and the client hold, and then forward the message to the next hop (the reverse process is true in
the other direction for messages sent from the server to the client, as each hop will iteratively add
a layer of encryption). In order to establish these encryption keys with each relay in the path,
clients negotiate session keys with each relay using public-key key establishment protocols, re-
sulting in the creation of a multi-layered encrypted communication tunnel called a circuit used
to route traffic through the network.
In order to improve scalability of anonymity networks used in practice such as Tor, Walking
Onions must build upon commonly used onion routing protocols, and specifically must limit
the amount of relay information required by the client to establish circuits with network relays.
However, Walking Onions must simultaneously maintain the capability for clients to be assured
that the integrity and confidentiality of their messages are preserved while traversing the network
through intermediate untrusted relays.
2.2 Tor
Tor [DMS04] is a low-latency onion-routing anonymity network with 2.5 to 11 million unique
users [Tor19b, MWBJ+18] and roughly 6,000 volunteer-run and independently operated re-
lays [Tor19a]. Tor ensures user anonymity by routing traffic along a three-hop circuit through the
network, thereby protecting against traffic analysis by adversaries such as a local internet service
provider (ISP) or intermediaries that observe internet traffic passing through central internet ex-
changes. Furthermore, using multi-hop circuits allows Tor to hide the IP addresses of Tor users
from destination servers hosting the requested content.
In this work, we will use Tor as a case study to demonstrate the applicability of the Walking
Onions protocols. While Tor is the largest of anonymity networks facilitating general internet ac-
cess today, in order to allow Tor to scale sufficiently to provide service to any internet-connected
user, Tor must be able to service an influx of users larger than an order of magnitude, and to add
a sufficient number of network relays to provide network bandwidth. For example, as modern
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web browsers such as Brave and Firefox explore adding Tor support for their users, the Tor net-
work must be able to support these levels of user numbers [Gab19]. As we describe below, the
current design of Tor cannot provide service at such a scale while both retaining the same threat
model and good user experience in terms of bandwidth and latency. Walking Onions will need to
provide a design to achieve just that—the ability to ensure network scalability while protecting
users within the current threat model of Tor and while providing a good user experience.
Existing Tor Protocol. Tor itself is composed of multiple protocols, defining how relay
information is securely distributed to all participants, how clients build circuits through the net-
work, how the network authorities vote for which relay information is published for the current
network epoch, and other network services requiring cooperation. We will now discuss sev-
eral Tor protocols that are related to our work. Specifically, we will now review Tor’s directory
protocol, which defines how network information is distributed, and Tor’s path selection and cir-
cuit extension protocols, which define how clients select relays for, and establish a secure path
through, the Tor network in order to exchange data.
Walking Onions will need to build upon these protocols in order to preserve their current
functionality and purpose while performing these operations in a more efficient manner in terms
of bandwidth and latency experienced by clients.
2.2.1 Tor’s directory system
Tor’s protocol requires clients and relays to keep up-to-date information about every relay in the
network. As such, Tor requires a consistent global view of relay information for every client and
relay participating in the network. Up-to-date relay information is provided by directory authori-
ties, a trusted set of servers administered by core members of the Tor community [Tor20a]. Every
network epoch (in Tor, one hour), relays upload information about themselves to the authorities,
who then vote on the status of these relays. The directory authorities combine information pro-
vided by the relays with information the authorities and other external parties collect about the
relay directly. For example, relays provide information about themselves including their pub-
lic identity keys and supported versions. Additional information measured by external parties
about the relay includes relays’ supported bandwidth. This external measurement is done in or-
der to prevent relays arbitrarily inflating information about themselves that could be used to their
advantage in the case of a malicious relay, such as the relay’s bandwidth capacity [BMG+07].
As we will discuss in Section 2.2.2, relays are not selected by clients uniformly, and so certain
characteristics about relays must be independently measured.
After gathering information about every relay in the network and voting on their status, the
authorities compute a multisigned consensus, which is the agreed-upon network directory doc-
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ument representing the conclusions of the authorities about the state of the relays making up
the Tor network. After receiving the consensus, clients and relays can validate the integrity,
authenticity, and timeliness of the latest consensus by validating the signatures and timestamp
included in the document. After directory authorities publish the consensus for the current epoch,
network relays fetch this most-recent consensus directly from the directory authorities. Relays
use the consensus directly, but also cache and serve the consensus to clients, in order to avoid
overwhelming the directory authorities and distribute the load required to serve this document to
every network participant.
To further conserve bandwidth, Tor uses a pair of optimizations to avoid multiple downloads
of redundant consensus information. First, to avoid publishing and downloading of relay infor-
mation which has not changed since the prior epoch, Tor publishes infrequently changing relay
information in a set of microdescriptors. Each epoch, clients download only the updated mi-
crodescriptors which they do not already have locally. Second, clients and relays can provide the
digest of an older consensus in their request for a newer consensus, and thereby receive only the
changes between the two documents.
Even considering the above optimizations, Tor’s existing directory protocol places an un-
desirable burden on clients in terms of memory and bandwidth as the number of relays in the
network increases. Because clients persist information about each relay, every additional relay
participating in the Tor network causes the size of the consensus to similarly increase.
Consequently, Walking Onions must balance the two requirements of directory protocols
similar to Tor’s. On one hand, Walking Onions must ensure clients use only timely and valid net-
work relay information that has been approved by the network authority such as Tor’s directory
authorities. On the other hand, Walking Onions must provide clients with the ability to maintain
less-than-linear growth relative to the number of relays in the network, to ensure clients with
limited bandwidth capacity—such as mobile clients—can continue to participate.
2.2.2 Tor’s path selection algorithm
Once a client has obtained the latest consensus, the client selects a list of relays to be used to
route traffic through the network. Tor clients do not select relays uniformly at random; instead,
for load balancing, they choose each relay with probability related its measured bandwidth and
intended position on the path. A path through the Tor network consists of a guard relay, which is
the relay occupying the first position on the path, and an exit node, which is the relay occupying
the last position on the path. Any relays occupying positions between the guard and exit position
are the middle nodes. As paths through the Tor network are typically three hops in length, most
paths will only have one middle node [DM20].
8
While the earliest versions of Tor’s onion routing protocol sampled relays for a path uni-
formly at random, today, Tor clients sample relays from a weighted distribution [Tor20d,Tor20b]
depending on the relay role and position within the path. Furthermore, selection of relays is of-
ten determined by the extent to which a relay fulfills some property. For example, Tor directory
authorities assign a flag label to relays to indicate that the relay meets sufficient requirements
to be selected for a specific position within a client’s path. When clients sample relays for the
guard position in a path, this sampling is weighted by the relay’s supported bandwidth, and also
must have been assigned the Guard flag by the directory authorities (the Guard flag is assigned
so long as the relay has fulfilled the required uptime and bandwidth capacity required by Tor for
relays in the guard position). Middle nodes are sampled similarly as weighted by bandwidth, but
require no additional flags or capabilities. Exit nodes are sampled weighted by bandwidth, but
additionally must advertise support in the node’s exit policy, which describes the port numbers
the relay will support forwarding traffic to. [Tor20b, Tor20d].
As such, Walking Onions similarly will need to support more complex path selection re-
quirements than simply selecting relays uniformly at random, while minimizing the amount of
information clients are required to know about each relay. Simultaneously, Walking Onions
will need to provide the capability for clients to verify that relays have been correctly selected
according to their requirements.
2.2.3 Tor’s existing circuit extension protocol
Tor uses a telescoping technique [DMS04] which establishes circuits one hop at a time. The
client uses each partially completed circuit to perform a handshake with the next relay in the
circuit, until the circuit is complete. Building circuits via this telescoping mechanism allows for
forward secrecy for the client communication, as the client negotiates a fresh shared session key
with each hop. However, this telescoping technique similarly increases the latency experienced
by the client between the start of circuit establishment until it completes. This latency can be
attributed to the fact that the client must perform n consecutive request/response round trips to
construct an n-hop circuit (one round trip between the client and each hop in the path). Tor
attempts to limit this latency by preemptively building circuits in advance for when the client
may need them, but in the case that no such preemptive circuits exist (such as when the client is
first bootstrapping), the client is forced to experience the full latency required to establish a fresh
circuit [Tor20d].
Negotiation of this shared symmetric key between the client and each hop in the path is im-
portant to protect against future key compromise. Because each party provides a fresh ephemeral
key for each handshake, compromise of one party’s private key will not impact either the client’s
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future or past communication, nor the communication between other clients that communicate
with a compromised relay. Key establishment in Tor is performed using using a variant of the
ntor protocol [GSU12, Mat20b], which allows for a half-authenticated handshake, in which the
client can authenticate the relay using the corresponding identity public key for this relay pub-
lished in the latest consensus. The resulting nested encryption layers (as further described in
Section 2.1) for messages sent through circuits in the Tor network provide additional layers of
protection against compromise of intermediate relays on the path.
To improve the user experience for clients, Walking Onions should provide a mechanism to
decrease the experienced latency for clients when establishing a circuit, while preserving the
existing security properties for onion-routed networks using telescoping techniques for circuit
establishment. Specifically, among other security properties such as confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity of client communication relayed through circuits, Walking Onions should also
preserve forward secrecy for client communication in the case of key compromise.
2.3 Attacks Against Anonymity Networks
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Tor currently follows the approach of requiring a globally consis-
tent view for network directory information, meaning that all clients and all relays must maintain
an up-to-date consensus. This approach is required by Tor to protect against a class of path-
based attacks, but has clear scalability limitations. While other anonymity network designs have
attempted to provide improved scalability, these designs have had undesirable consequences on
the security guarantees of the system, which we will further review in Chapter 3. Our work
provides a “best of both worlds” approach by ensuring improved scalability without significant
changes to Tor’s threat model, which we further discuss in in Chapter 4.
We now describe several relevant attacks against anonymity networks, and later in Chapter 3
we will describe several demonstrated examples of other anonymity network designs that do not
protect against such attacks. Specifically, we will examine epistemic and route capture attacks
and discuss how such attacks result in compromised security and privacy to clients.
We emphasize these attacks specifically because these attacks are protected against in Tor’s
current design, and it is critical that Walking Onions successfully protects these as well, even
while seeking to improve the scalability and efficiency of the network.
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2.3.1 Epistemic Attacks
One attack to compromise the privacy of users of an anonymity network is an epistemic attack,
where an adversary can use information leaked to network observers, such as the frequency of
connections to a certain relay or the client’s choice of which relays to build paths through [DC06,
DS08]. As such, in anonymity network designs where each client has a different, and partial,
view of the relays making up the network, which nodes a client selects for their paths can be
used as a unique fingerprint. This fingerprint arises from the fact that the views of the relays
making up the network differ between each client, and the selection of one relay over another
allows an adversary recording network traffic to deduce information about the client’s access
patterns. Such an attack could result in the adversary eventually piecing together an end-to-end
correlation between the client and their end destination.
Tor protects against epistemic attacks by requiring all users and relays to hold a globally con-
sistent view [Tor20a], as all users and relays maintain the identical consensus document. How-
ever, as further elaborated in Section 2.2.1, this approach has significant scalability problems.
Walking Onions will need to protect against epistemic attacks while improving the scalability of
anonymity networks such as Tor.
2.3.2 Route Capture Attacks
Route capture attacks are one variant of path-based attacks, and result in an attacker compromis-
ing the integrity of a client’s path through the network by replacing or influencing the selection of
relays for the path [WMB10]. These attacks can pass undetected if clients’ views of the network
are not consistent and authenticated. Furthermore, the capability for an adversary to perform
route capture attacks depends on the amount of influence intermediate nodes are allowed over
the client’s path selection when constructing circuits through the network. For example, a system
in which each node on a path is responsible for selecting the next node is trivially vulnerable to
a route capture attack: a malicious node can always only select other collaborating malicious
nodes, yielding an entirely malicious path.
Tor currently protects against route capture attacks using two approaches [Tor20a]. First, the
network directory document that distributes relay information to the network is authenticated
by the directory authorities, who serve as the root of trust for the network. Second, all clients
receive exactly the same relay information, ensuring that a malicious intermediary cannot in-
fluence which relay information a client receives or does not receive. If the network directory
document were unauthenticated, an intermediary could trivially replace valid relay information
with arbitrarily chosen information. If clients could receive different views of the network, with-
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out a mechanism to validate their view is trustworthy, an intermediary could arbitrarily inject or
withhold relay information from specific clients.
Walking Onions will need to distribute authenticated relay information in an efficient man-
ner that simultaneously protects against path-based attacks. Furthermore, Walking Onions will
need to ensure that such an authentication mechanism both ensures that received information is
authenticated by the root of trust for the anonymity network, and that their selection has not been
influenced by a malicious intermediary.
2.4 Cryptographic Sortition
In Walking Onions, our approach to improving user experience by decreasing the latency clients
experience during circuit build time while remaining secure against attacks discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3 requires that we employ specialized cryptographic primitives. As we will further discuss
in our protocol specification in Chapter 6, Walking Onions will build upon the concept of cryp-
tographic sortition—verifiably randomly selecting participants from a global set—to determine
which relays are selected for a client’s path through an anonymity network.
Cryptographic Sortition typically is instantiated using Verifiable Random Functions
(VRFs) [MVR99] as the underlying cryptographic primitive to generate a random output, which
we will now describe.
2.4.1 Verifiable Random Functions
Given an input string and a public/private keypair, VRFs produce an output and a proof, of which
the output is simultaneously deterministic but unpredictable to anyone without knowledge of the
private key used to process the input. However, anyone can use the corresponding public key to
verify the correctness of the output using the proof. In short, only the holder of the private key
can compute the output, but anyone with the public key can verify this output.
Notably, VRFs define three functions: a function to generate the public/private keypair which
we refer to as KeyGen, a function that accepts an input string and generates an output and a proof
using the secret key which we refer to as Prove, and a function which we refer to as Verify
which determines the correctness of the output given the public key, input string, and proof.
We introduce the definition of these functions more formally and their use in Walking Onions
protocols in Section 6.1.3.
The desired properties from a VRF are as follows, and are a summarization from the proper-
ties as presented in the IETF draft specifying VRFs [GRPV19]:
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Uniqueness. When querying an input to Prove, each input for any public/private keypair
produces a unique and deterministic output.
Collision resistance. Finding two inputs to Prove that produce the identical output for a single
public key must be cryptographically hard for an adversary.
Pseudorandomness. To an adversary with knowledge of only the public key and the ability to
query inputs and observe outputs, every output must be unpredictable to the adversary.
VRFs can be instantiated using different instantiations of public-key cryptographic primi-
tives, such as RSA or elliptic curves, as described in the VRF standardization draft [GRPV19].
The choice of which instantiation to use will depend on the implementation. However, for our
definition of Single-Pass Walking Onions, we use an instantiation of a VRF whose public keys
come from a prime-order group over an elliptic curve.
2.4.2 Applications of Cryptographic Sortition
Sortition has a number of applications in distributed networks; for example, the Algorand Byzan-
tine agreement protocol uses sortition for leader election. Specifically, leader election in the Al-
gorand Byzantine agreement protocol verifiably selects nodes at random for leader election and
to participate in a consensus protocol for the current network epoch [GHM+17]. Using a VRF
for the cryptographic sortition of selected users for a given epoch enables users to present proofs
publicly to demonstrate their inclusion in the given round.
2.5 Multi-Party Signature Schemes
As mentioned in Section 2.3, Walking Onions requires the ability to authenticate network direc-
tory documents in order to ensure clients can validate the integrity of the path they build through
the network. However, this authentication mechanism can vary depending on the anonymity
network design. Here, we examine several cryptographic primitives that can be used to issue
an authentication value as the result of multiple parties cooperating to produce the value, as is
required by anonymity networks such as Tor.
First, we look at aggregate signatures, which allow n signatures issued by n different parties
to be aggregated into a single signature over each document. Next, we look at multisignatures,
which are a special case of aggregated signatures, as the resulting signature is valid over only
a single document that has been independently signed by each participating signer. Finally, we
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Aggregate signatures provide an n-out-of-n scheme in which the resulting signature represents
the aggregation of n signatures all issued by a different signer [BGLS03b]. Notably, signature
aggregation can be performed for signatures over different messages. More formally, an aggre-
gated signature scheme accepts tuples of the form (Yi, σ1,m1), . . . , (Yn, σn,mn), where Yi is the
public key for the signing party, σi is the signature over message mi, and produces a single joint
signature Σ over all of the messages (m1, . . . ,mn).
Aggregate signature schemes implement four algorithms: KeyGen, Sign, Combine, and Ver-
ify. KeyGen, Sign, and Verify are standard for any signature scheme. Combine accepts a set of
tuples, where each tuple contains a message, a public key, and a signature, and outputs a sin-
gle signature over all of the messages in the set [Bon11]. The design of aggregated signature
schemes may allow for random order when performing the aggregation, or may require strict
ordering [BGLS03a]. Finally, because the Combine algorithm does not require privileged infor-
mation or access, anyone can perform this operation, not just the participants.
Constructions
Aggregate signatures were first presented by Boneh et al. [BGLS03b] and are among the better-
known schemes in the literature, and builds upon the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature
scheme [BLS04]. However, to prevent against rogue-key attacks, all n messages are required to
be distinct. One possible mechanism to ensure message uniqueness is for participants to prepend
their public key to each message. However, such a simple solution is not viable in a setting where
a participant may produce a signature over the same message multiple times.
While the above scheme allows aggregation in random order, other aggregate signature
schemes schemes have also been proposed requiring sequential aggregation during the sign-
ing stage but random order during the validation stage. Lysyanskaya et al. [LMRS04] present a
sequential aggregate signature scheme based on RSA signatures. Bellare et al. [BNN07] address
the limitations by Boneh et al. [BGLS03b] and present slight modifications to a construction by
Lysyanskaya et al. [LMRS04], ensuring the resulting scheme is unrestricted such that signatures
over identical messages remain secure against the rogue-key attack. Lu et al. [LOS+06] present
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a sequential aggregated signature scheme based on Diffie-Hellman operations and security as-
sumptions, and prove the security of the resulting scheme without requiring the assumption of
random oracles.
One important point to note is that to validate signatures resulting from the above schemes,
n public keys (one public key from each signer) are required to perform the validation, imposing
linear growth of public key material relative to n. Boneh, Drijvers, and Neven [BDN18] present
a multi-signature scheme with public-key aggregation, to ensure constant growth of key material
as the number of signers increases. Furthermore, this scheme protects against forged messages
via the rogue-key attack without requiring unique messages or providing proof of knowledge for
the corresponding private key.
2.5.2 Multisignatures
Definition and Instantiation
Multisignatures are a subclass of aggregated signatures, as all parties sign the identical document
but each produces a separate signature over this document, which are later aggregated into a sin-
gle joint signature. As such, multisignatures are a subclass of aggregate signatures. Similar to the
more general case, validation of multisignatures requires either all n public keys corresponding
to each signer, or a single aggregate public key, if supported by the underlying scheme.
We will now review several schemes more recently proposed in the literature that could be
good candidates for anonymity networks with a distributed root of trust, such as directory au-
thorities in the Tor network.
Constructions
MuSig [MPSW19] presents a Schnorr-based multisignature scheme which allows for key aggre-
gation. MuSig uses ECDSA as its underlying signature scheme in order to be fully compatible
with Bitcoin. MuSig operates in the “plain public key model” while protecting against rogue-
key attacks, meaning that validation of the signature requires only the corresponding public keys.
MuSig requires three rounds of interactivity between signers to produce a signature. Although
the authors have published a 2-round variant in prior work, the security of this variant is not yet
proven under standard assumptions.
Boneh et al. [BDN18] present a modification to MuSig that uses BLS signatures [BLS04] as
the underlying signature primitive. Doing so allows for public-key aggregation and fast verifi-
cation while relying on the plain public-key model and provable security. Furthermore, signing
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operations can be performed in a single round. Finally, the authors present an accountable vari-
ant, allowing for verifiability of the identities of the signers.
2.5.3 Threshold Signatures
Definition and Instantiation
Threshold signatures allow for signing messages under a t-out-of-n trust model, in which n
separate entities are pre-authorized to perform signing operations, but generating a signature
requires t of these entities to coordinate to produce a single joint signature. The secret key used
to produce the signature is distributed over all participants, but only a single public key is used to
validate the signature. As such, the use of a threshold signature scheme to generate a signature
is transparent to the verifier of the signature, as this signature can be validated using operations
standard for validating a signature produced by a single entity.
To limit trust in any one party, threshold signature schemes often make use of a Distributed
Key Generation (DKG) scheme to generate the long-lived secret key shares, allowing all partici-
pants to contribute equally in the key generation stage.
The algorithms implemented by a threshold signature Scheme are as follows. KeyGen gener-
ates a single public key and n secret shares (one for each participant). Sign requires t participants
to coordinate to produce a joint signature. Verify allows a single party to verify the correctness of
the signature, where the operations followed to perform validation is identical to the underlying
signature scheme in a setting with only one participant.
Accountability. Note that one attribute of threshold signatures is that such schemes are non-
attributable, meaning that the resulting signature does not disclose which parties participated to
create the signature. We discuss the case when both accountability and redundancy are desirable
for joint signature schemes in Section 2.5.4.
Complexity of Underlying Signature Schemes. As threshold signatures employ signature
schemes as an underlying primitive (such as RSA, Schnorr, or ECDSA), the implementation of
the threshold signature scheme will depend on which signature primitive is used. Consequently,
the choice of signature scheme in turn impacts the complexity of the threshold scheme itself. We
discuss the complexity of these schemes when presenting constructions below.
Constructions
We now provide a brief review of Schnorr and ECDSA-based threshold signature schemes; these
schemes could be used by a distributed network authority in Walking Onions to produce an au-
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thenticated network directory document in which the signing process requires a threshold number
of network authorities.
Schnorr Signatures. Using Schnorr signatures [Sch91] as the underlying signature primitive
is by far the simplest and most straightforward for threshold signature designs. As Schnorr sig-
natures utilize a random value for each signing operation, no single party should choose or hold
full knowledge of this value, as doing so has security consequences and could lead to one party
learning the secret shares for other participants. However, because Schnorr requires only additive
operations to this random value during the signing operation, generating Schnorr signatures in a
threshold setting consists merely of an iterative summation of partial signatures contributed by t
signing parties.
Stinson and Strobl [SS01] introduce a Schnorr-based threshold signature scheme in which
key generation and signing are both multi-round interactive protocols. Distributed Key Genera-
tion is performed using a scheme by Gennaro et al. [GJKR07] to generate a random shared secret
in both the key generation and signing stages. The applicability of this threshold scheme is pre-
sented as a use case in a distributed certificate scheme requiring a threshold number of certificate
authorities to issue a certificate.
ECDSA Signatures. ECDSA signatures require finding the inverse of a randomly sampled
value k and then multiplying the resulting value to the secret key held by the signing party. How-
ever, performing these operations jointly across multiple participants without revealing k to any
party—while maintaining equal contributions and levels of trust by all parties—adds significant
complexity to these schemes as compared to simple variants such as those based on Schnorr
signatures.
Gennaro et al. [GGN16] and Gennaro and Goldfeder [GG18] present ECDSA-based thresh-
old schemes instantiated with Paillier [Pai99], an additively homomorphic encryption scheme,
and require each player to perform multiplicative-to-additive share conversion subprotocols.
Gennaro and Goldfeder [GG18] presents an improvement, moving from requiring 2t+ 1 cooper-
ating signers to only t participants. However, this approach similarly requires converting shares
from multiplicative to additive, which in turn requires first a pairwise protocol round between
each participant to all other participants, followed by a second protocol round to coordinate gen-
erating the joint signature. In total, the signing round requires a five-phase protocol, with three
broadcast phases among all players.
Distributed Key Generation Constructions
When performing threshold signing without requiring a central trusted authority (as is in the case
of Shamir’s secret sharing), using a Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol facilitates the
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generation of a shared secret among all participants, such that all participants know and share the
public value, but each participant maintains a unique share of the resulting secret.
The first DKG proposed was by Pedersen, as part of a trustless threshold cryptosystem that
does not require a central trusted dealer as is required in secret-sharing schemes such as Shamir’s
secret sharing [Sha79]. In Pedersen’s construction, all parties collectively generate the random
shared secret. This operation is performed by each party locally selecting a random value, and
then secret sharing this to all other parties, keeping one share for themselves. Each party’s
share of the collectively shared secret is calculated by the (local) summation of each party’s
received shares. To prevent against misbehaving participants, verifying the correctness of shares
is important in this context, as shares are no longer computed by a central trusted dealer. As the
underlying secret-sharing primitive, Pedersen’s scheme uses Feldman’s Verifiable Secret Sharing
(VSS) scheme [Fel87], but with every participant performing the actions of the dealer separately.
However, Gennaro et al. [GJKR07] demonstrate that Feldman’s VSS does not completely
protect against an adversary adaptively manipulating the output distribution of the secret af-
ter observing the inputs from other parties. To avoid this attack, the authors adapt Pedersen’s
DKG [Ped91] to use an additional commitment phase between participants at the start of the
protocol. In this commitment phase, every party uses Pedersen’s VSS [Ped92] to commit to their
random choice before distributing shares to every party, thereby avoiding the adversary from
adaptively selecting a more favourable input.
In a separate work, Gennaro et al. [GJKR03] demonstrate that certain threshold cryptosys-
tems remain secure when initialized using Pedersen’s DKG [Ped91] even though the distribution
of the shared secret may be biased by a misbehaving adversary. The authors prove that the shared
secret is sufficiently random for secure initialization of certain threshold schemes, and demon-
strate one such case using a threshold Schnorr-based signature. However, using Pedersen’s DKG
has a tradeoff between efficiency and underlying security. For a q-order subgroup of field Fp,
achieving the same security level as the scheme presented in Gennaro et al. [GJKR07] requires
that q be twice as long and p to be 23 times longer. Consequently, the growth of these parame-
ters results in the growth of the cost of computation by a factor of 10. However, as Pedersen’s
DKG [Ped91] requires only one round of interactivity (where each participant acts as the dealer),
as opposed to two as presented in Gennaro et al. [GJKR07], the tradeoff between computational
cost and interactivity is one that depends on the use case in practice.
Kate and Goldberg [KG09] present an asynchronous distributed key generation protocol that
considers a setting in which participant nodes are separated by a network partition and can crash
(and later recover) or the network can fail. Furthermore, the threat model includes a t-limited
Byzantine adversary that can perform arbitrary actions outside of the protocol. The protocol
definition includes a leader-based agreement scheme and allows for group modification, such as
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node addition and removal, as well as threshold modification.
2.5.4 Accountable Subgroup Signatures
In an accountable subgroup scheme, t out of v authorized signers can produce a valid signature,
and the verifier of this signature can verify which t signers cooperated to produce the signature.
Recall that in Section 2.5.3 we discussed how threshold signatures provide this first capability,
but not the latter. Consequently, such schemes muse use alternative constructions. Maintaining
both accountability and the ability to generate a valid signature with the cooperation of only a
subset of signers is desirable in many settings, such as in the case of certificate authorities that
cooperate to produce a joint signature over a single certificate.
Micali et al. [MOR01] present the first formalization and construction of accountable sub-
group signatures. In accountable subgroup signature schemes, the signature comprises an aggre-
gate signature that is generated by t authorized signers, as well as a set of identifiers for each
signer. This scheme ensures accountability as the verifier can determine which of the t (out of n)
signers participated in the signing process.
Earlier constructions of accountable subgroup signature scheme represented the public key
as the set of tuples of (identifier, public key) for the n valid participants. However, such an
approach results in the linear growth of the public key relative to the number of participants. in
schemes such as that by Boneh, Drijvers, and Neven [BDN18], the public key is aggregated,
thereby limiting the growth of the size of the public key relative to the number of signers.
2.6 Proofs of Inclusion
While signatures provide one mechanism to validate the integrity of a document, proofs of in-
clusion provide another mechanism, so long as the proof itself includes an authentication tag
issued by a trusted authority. To that end, we demonstrate later how Walking Onions can lever-
age proofs of inclusion to reliably demonstrate information about a specific relay is part of a set
of documents published by a trusted authority.
Merkle trees are one common cryptographic primitive that implement such proofs of inclu-
sion, which we now describe in greater detail.
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2.6.1 Merkle Trees
Merkle trees [Mer88] are a common solution to provide an integrity value over a set of docu-
ments. Merkle trees provide proofs of inclusion termed Merkle proofs, which demonstrate that
a particular document is in fact part of a larger collection of documents. For example, Merkle
trees are used in the Certificate Transparency protocol [LLK13] to demonstrate inclusion of a
specific certificate in a publicly auditable log, to protect against certificate authorities minting
rogue certificates without oversight.
Merkle trees utilize a binary tree structure; the leaves are a collection of values such that
individual values can later be validated to be within the entire collection. Each non-leaf node of
the tree is generated by computing a hash of its children. Merkle trees implement the following
functionality: Add, Prove, and Validate. The function Add accepts an input to add to the Merkle
tree, and adds this input as a new leaf to the tree. Doing so requires re-deriving the root hash
as well as all hashes on the path from the leaf to the root. Thus, the output of Add is a new
Merkle tree with the inclusion of the new input. Prove accepts an input, and outputs a Merkle
proof demonstrating the inclusion of this input in the tree. The Merkle proof demonstrates that
this input is a valid leaf in the current Merkle tree, and consists of the path in the Merkle tree
starting with the leaf (the input to prove) and demonstrating a path from this leaf through each
level in the tree to the root hash. Concretely, the Merkle proof is the set of sibling elements to the
elements making up the direct path from the leaf to the root node. Validate accepts as input the
Merkle proof that is generated by Prove, as well as a valid root hash for the current Merkle tree.
To validate the Merkle proof, each element of the proof is iteratively hashed together, eventually
deriving a separate root hash. The Merkle proof is correct if the derived root hash matches the
valid Merkle tree root hash.
2.7 Summary
Walking Onions builds upon onion routing to provide a scalable design for path-selection and
circuit-establishment protocols for anonymity networks used in practice, such as Tor. However,
Walking Onions must ensure that the network can both scale efficiently and maintain safety
against known attacks, such as epistemic and route capture attacks. To demonstrate the applica-
bility of our work, we use the Tor network as a case study.
To accomplish these goals, Walking Onions makes use of cryptographic primitives presented
in this chapter. First, cryptographic sortition via Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) provides
verifiability of the randomness of another peer’s output, given a specific input and a public/private
keypair. Such assurances are useful to improving the efficiency for path selection through an
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anonymity network, as we will see later in the design of Walking Onions. Second, multiparty
signature schemes allow multiple parties to cooperate to generate signatures over a document or
set of documents. In the setting for Walking Onions, multiparty signature schemes are useful
when the trusted authority for a anonymity network is divided among a trusted set of entities.
Finally, proofs of inclusion such as Merkle trees provide an efficient mechanism to verify a
specific element is included within a larger set. These primitives will be useful when we discuss
how networks using Walking Onions can distribute network information more efficiently even as




In this chapter, we review designs for managing the state of anonymity networks, specifically
focusing on designs for distribution mechanisms of up-to-date network directory documents to
network participants. We examine designs for completely decentralized anonymity networks
in the literature and in practice, and also survey several scalability designs for the Tor network
specifically. We summarize the differences in how anonymity network designs protect against
known network attacks in a side-by-side comparison of each design against a range of attacks
discussed in the literature. Next, we review designs for single-pass circuit creation protocols and
discuss tradeoffs between design choices with a specific focus on how these choices impact the
security guarantees of the protocol. As Walking Onions should both limit the amount of net-
work directory information required by clients as well as present a circuit creation protocol more
efficient in terms of latency, understanding designs that had a similar outcome (linear number
of messages relative to the length of the circuit) but undesirable security outcomes is important.
We conclude by discussing how Walking Onions can learn from the state of the literature and in
which aspects Walking Onions will need to improve in order to offer a compelling alternative to
be used in practice by anonymity networks such as Tor.
3.1 Designs for Managing Network Information
In a survey by Shiraz et al. [SSA+18], anonymity networks fall into two categories depending
on how paths are built. Paths can be either source-routed, in which the client holds complete
control over path selection, or hop-by-hop, in which intermediate nodes are allowed to influence
the next relay selected. The latter approach can allow for adversary-run intermediate nodes to
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use this position of influence over the client’s path to their advantage, as we will further discuss
in our review of such designs. However, source-routed networks, such as Tor, have scalability
costs. Because the clients in source-routed networks hold complete control over which relays are
chosen for the path, efficiency tradeoffs arise in terms of which information clients must persist
locally in order to make these decisions, or latency and bandwidth tradeoffs if the client asks
for relay information from a separate entity, such as a set of Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
servers, which we further describe below. Walking Onions will need to maintain the best of both
approaches, maintaining the security of source-routed designs while the efficiency of hop-by-hop
designs.
We will now describe several anonymity network designs, focusing specifically on how net-
work directory information is distributed to clients and how paths are built through the anonymity
network. We first describe path-routing and circuit-establishment designs for centralized net-
works, which depend on a root of trust for the network to determine the network’s current state.
As part of this review, we look at several proposed designs for the Tor network with the inten-
tion to improve efficiency over the current Tor design, further described in Section 2.2. We then
describe path-routing and circuit-establishment designs for decentralized networks, in which all
network participants hold equal levels of trust and responsibility when determining the current
state of the network.
3.1.1 Centralized Anonymity Networks
While Tor is one of the better-known anonymity networks that require a centralized approach to
network information distribution, other anonymity networks also require centralization in order
to protect against path-based attacks described in Section 2.3. Walking Onions similarly will
need to protect against such attacks, and thus must integrate and work within the threat model of
anonymity networks such as Tor.
Katzenpost [ADD+17] is a mix network that implements the Loopix [PHE+17] design, a mix
net anonymity network design that provides improved latency guarantees than previous designs.
Loopix presents a medium-latency network protocol that utilizes dummy messages for cover
traffic and randomized message delays to protect against network timing attacks and a global
adversary who can observe end-to-end network traffic. Furthermore, Loopix defines a layered
topology, in which nodes of the network are stratified into separate sets and messages only pass
through one node per layer. This layered design ensures that links between nodes in each layer
are well covered and mix traffic well in a few steps, as traffic passes between nodes that are in
separate layers [DSS05]. While Loopix defines the network topology and circuit-establishment
protocol, Loopix does not define how network directory information should be collected, authen-
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ticated, and distributed to both clients and relays. However, Loopix requires clients to maintain
up-to-date information about network relays, as routes through the Loopix network are source-
routed; clients themselves select each relay that will become part of their path. As an instantiation
of Loopix, Katzenpost requires a globally consistent network view, and utilizes a set of directory
authorities for node registration and to distribute authenticated network directory information to
all network participants [ADPS16].
We will now review alternative designs to the Tor network that have been proposed to address
similar scalability issues that Walking Onions should address, and discuss the tradeoffs with each
approach.
3.1.2 Scalability Designs for Tor
Torsk [MTHK09] is a design to improve the scalability of the Tor network by reducing the
amount of relay information clients must locally maintain. The Torsk design distributes relay di-
rectory information over a Distributed Hash Table, or DHT. This design allows a client to extend
a circuit without requiring up-front relay information in order to perform a circuit extension, as
selection of the next relay in the circuit Rn is determined by the previous relay in the circuit
Rn−1 performing a DHT lookup. To avoid information leaks resulting from these DHT lookups,
each node performs lookups using a secret “buddy nodes” as a one-hop proxy. However, analy-
sis by Wang et al. [WMB10] demonstrates security weaknesses in the method by which buddy
nodes are selected in Torsk, leading to possible route capture attacks, as an adversary could gain
outsized advantage in the selection of a relay’s buddy node.
PIR-based designs
PIR-Tor [MOT+11] allows clients to download information about a small subset of relays from
a set of authorities using private information retrieval (PIR), thereby preventing observation of
which relays a client requests. Notably, while PIR-Tor allows clients to download less relay in-
formation than Tor’s current approach of requiring a globally consistent network view, PIR-Tor
works within Tor’s current threat model and protects against epistemic attacks by hiding from
directory authorities and network observers which relays the client is requesting. However, PIR-
Tor imposes undesirable performance or security tradeoffs depending on which PIR design is
used to instantiate the private lookups in PIR-Tor. Specifically, C-PIR designs are costly in CPU
resources, and IT-PIR designs require an assumption of non-collusion between PIR servers in
order to remain secure. ConsenSGX [SG19] improves upon the resource usage of PIR-based re-
lay selection by using trusted execution environments like Intel’s SGX. Both approaches provide
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control to the client while limiting the amount of data the client must maintain, but are limited
by the performance and bandwidth costs of PIR or the security shortfalls of trusted execution
environments.
3.1.3 Decentralized Anonymity Networks
While later in this work we use Tor specifically as a case study to demonstrate the applicability
of Walking Onions, Walking Onions should also be applicable in the context of a decentralized
network. How network directory documents are authenticated will depend on whether the net-
work relies on a centralized or decentralized design. The design of the authentication mechanism
itself is out of scope for this work, although later we will discuss ideas that decentralized designs
could adopt to facilitate the use of Walking Onions in such a setting. However, we will now
review several decentralized network designs in the literature and in practice. Similarly to our
analysis of centralized networks, we will examine how network information is distributed and
how clients establish paths and circuits through the network.
Crowds [RDR97] relies on a peer-to-peer protocol in which all clients are also nodes in
the network. Paths through the network are determined using a “coin-flipping” random-walk
technique, where each node forwards requests either to another intermediate node, or directly to
the intended recipient, depending on a weighted coin flip, continuing until the message reaches
the recipient. Responses are relayed back along the same path in the reverse order. Crowds is
trivially vulnerable to route capture attacks because of its hop-by-hop routing: a single hostile
node can choose a hostile node (or no node at all!) as its successor, thereby ensuring that the rest
of the path will be hostile.
MorphMix [RP02, RP04] is a peer-to-peer decentralized circuit-based anonymity mix net-
work. Clients exchange messages in MorphMix using multi-layered encrypted tunnels, as in
onion routing. Relays in the network have ony a partial view of the entire network and receive
network information from their known peers. Client paths extend using a hop-by-hop approach;
each intermediate hop selects at random several relays as options for the next hop. Although the
client directly selects only the first hop in the path, the client also selects at random “witness
nodes”, which help in the selection of further relays proposed for the path. Although MorphMix
includes a collusion detection system to prevent intermediate nodes from biasing relay selection,
this detection system can be fooled by a malicious relay providing a set of relay options (for the
next hop in the path) that were not selected uniformly at random, but instead specially crafted
to circumvent the collusion detection system [TB06]. Thus, MorphMix is vulnerable to route
capture attacks, as it cannot prevent against route selection bias from malicious intermediaries.
To solve the issues that arise from hop-by-hop designs that can lead to route capture attacks,
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Salsa [NW06] presents an anonymity network design that uses a DHT to publish network di-
rectory information. Furthermore, this DHT determines which nodes become the next hop in a
client’s path through the network. Relays are required to have knowledge of all other relays log-
ically near them in the DHT, and limited knowledge of relays far from them. The requirement of
using a DHT to facilitate relay lookups is intended to prevent malicious nodes from influencing
the selection of relays for the client’s path. To ensure a malicious node has not influenced path
selection, each selection for the next hop is done by performing redundant lookups. More specif-
ically, relays will look up information for r relays at each hop, as opposed to one single relay,
and present this information to the client. The client then will select one relay from the r options
to serve as the next hop. However, the approach of performing redundant recursive lookups for
specific nodes results in an exploitable information leak [MB12], such that passive adversaries
observing network traffic can infer the nodes in a specific circuit. As such, passive adversaries
detecting redundant queries can perform epistemic attacks using observed network patterns.
ShadowWalker [MB09] uses a peer-to-peer random-walk protocol and a DHT to distribute
relay information to other relays in the network. ShadowWalker requires circuits to be built
using a hop-by-hop approach with additional verification by the client. To extend a circuit,
the client sends a randomly selected index to an intermediate node, which the node uses to
perform a lookup in its finger table of known neighbours. ShadowWalker protects against trivial
routing attacks by requiring relays to commit to routes by distributing their local finger tables to
deterministically chosen “shadow nodes”, which the client then uses to verify the response for
their selected index. Verification that a route is included in a node’s routing table is done via
Merkle proofs, in which the root hash is signed by the node and distributed to its shadow nodes
to commit to a specific route. In spite of these techniques, ShadowWalker is still vulnerable to
route capture attacks [SDH+10] when an insufficient number of shadow peers are used, leading
to an eclipse attack in which an attacker can compromise a “neighborhood” of nodes, resulting
in malicious nodes becoming shadows for each other. Increasing the number of shadow peers
protects against such eclipse attacks because at least one honest node is required to inform the
client of the dishonest behaviour. However, increasing the number of shadow peers results in the
strengthening of the ability for an attacker to launch a selective denial-of-service attack, which
can result from a shadow node refusing to provide its signature for its known routes. Furthermore,
the probability of epistemic attacks in ShadowWalker grows relative to the length of the path, as a
network adversary can correlate each peer’s view of the network with the path the route followed,
increasing the probability of determining where the route originated from.
The Invisible Internet Project (I2P) is a peer-to-peer, fully decentralized anonymous overlay
network [ZH11]. Like Tor, I2P implements source-based routing. However, instead of building
long-lived circuits between peers through the network, I2P requires participants to build incom-
ing and outgoing tunnels, which serve as entry points for sending and receiving messages. This
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design is similar to Tor’s onion service protocol, which uses similarly designed introduction
points for connecting clients and hidden services. I2P also uses garlic routing for message en-
cryption between nodes in a path; unlike onion routing, in garlic routing, all messages are self
contained and do not depend on relays persisting long-lived connection state. Furthermore, the
nature of self-contained messages in garlic routing allows intermediate relays to bundle multi-
ple messages within a single encrypted packet destined for their peer (similarly to how a garlic
contains multiple cloves). Furthermore, unlike Tor, I2P does not rely on central authorities to
distribute network directory information. Instead, untrusted “netfill” routers maintain a DHT
that represents all network information, and gossip relay information updates to their known
peers. Consequently, the integrity of gossip messages between nodes cannot be validated for its
integrity or authenticity by clients or relays. As such, malicious relays can gossip false informa-
tion to its peers or influence routes through the network, as the network directory information
served by any netfill router cannot be validated [I2P10].
Cascade network designs require the anonymity network to be divided into stratified lay-
ers; routes through the cascade network subsequently contain one relay from each layer. Vu-
vuzela [vdHLZZ15]—a private messaging network that is designed for high scalability while
protecting sensitive information such as message metadata—is one example of a cascade net-
work. In Vuvuzela, users are pre-assigned fixed “dead drops”, which are independently operated
servers in the Vuvuzela network. Users exchange messages with other users by sending their
messages to these dead drops, which the other user will then request their messages from. New
dead drops are assigned to users upon each new “round”, or network epoch. A trivial end-to-end
linking attack by a network observer is prevented by the fact that the dead drop serves as this
connection point for many sets of users. Consequently, users of a single dead drop have effec-
tively as much anonymity as the number of other users assigned to this particular dead drop.
Similar in design to Vuvuzela is the Java Anon Proxy (JAP) [Tea11], another example of a cas-
cade mix network. However, in JAP, users themselves choose one of several publicly available
sets of independently-run mix servers to use to exchange messages through. Consequently, users
of cascade mix networks such as Vuvuzela and JAP enjoy as much privacy as provided within
their specific partition of the network. In contrast, users of “free-routed” networks, where paths
through the network can traverse through any network relay, make up a single anonymity set; to
deanonymize these users, attackers must distinguish one user from all other users in the network
as a whole, as opposed from all other users in a subset.
Dandelion [BVFV17] and Dandelion++ [FVB+18] present a lightweight gossip protocol for
cryptocurrency networks to protect against mass deanonymization (as opposed to targeted at-
tacks). Dandelion and Dandelion++ protect against a weak but highly connected adversary (such
as a botnet) that can hold “supernode” status in the network by maintaining connections to the
majority of all peers in the network. Supernodes of this kind can passively gather information
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about the network at large and correlate messages to the originating node that was used to publish
the message (in the case of a cryptocurrency, each message is a transaction). While Dandelion
only assumes adversaries who can corrupt up to some large fraction of the network but follow the
protocol honestly, Dandelion++ considers a stronger adversarial model, such that adversaries are
allowed the power to maintain arbitrarily many connections to other nodes; thereby acting out-
side the limited number of connections specified in the Bitcoin protocol. Both protocols follow
a randomized design to determine if intermediate nodes should either forward traffic to a single
neighbor (making up the “stem” ) or to broadcast the transaction to the entire network (creat-
ing the “fluff”) . While this approach demonstrates privacy against adversaries seeking to per-
form mass deanonymization, neither protocol considers adversaries seeking to perform targeted
attacks against specific nodes, transactions, or users. Furthermore, the protocol is performed
without encrypting messages between peers, so does not protect against colluding nodes in the
same stem. Finally, further evaluation is needed to assess how a highly asymmetric network
impacts the effectiveness of the design, such as the case if a handful of nodes are responsible for
generating an outsized number of transactions.
3.1.4 Comparison of Security Properties
Because Walking Onions should simultaneously provide security against the attacks described
in Section 2.3, while improving the scalability of the network such that the knowledge the client
requires remains constant even as the network grows, it is important to understand how each
network design impacts its security.
We will now provide a high-level comparison of the anonymity network designs presented in
the previous section and how these designs compare against the presented attacks. We summarize
our findings in Table 3.1.
Description of classes of attacks
Before comparing specific attacks against the anonymity networks we reviewed in in Section 2.3,
we will first present a summary of these attacks as background knowledge.
• Epistemic attacks, as further described in Section 2.3.1, occur when an attacker observing
the network can gain information about a specific client due to relays the client selects to
build paths with.
• Route capture attacks, as further described in Section 2.3.2, occur when one node can
influence a client’s path through the network without detection.
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• Limited anonymity set does not treat all users of an anonymity network as a single set, and
instead divides users using some partitioning scheme into smaller subgroups. Ideally, users
are within the largest anonymity set as possible, as an attacker’s advantage to distinguish
a single user is only so large as their anonymity set. As such, an attacker must be able to
distinguish one user’s pattern of behaviour among all other users (as opposed to only users
within their respective set).
• Timing fingerprinting attacks occur when an attacker observing the network can distin-
guish identifiable information about the user by characterizing timing of user-influenced
behaviour. For example, certain protocols have a unique fingerprint for the timing of net-
work packets exchanged between parties; an attacker observing timing of such network
packets exchanged between relays could perform an end-to-end correlation using timing
delay as a fingerprint.
• Usage fingerprinting attacks occur when a user’s behaviour on the network can be dis-
tinguished from other users, such the pattern of information retrieval. For example, in a
network where users can hold differing views of the network, a user’s query for network
information updates can leak a unique fingerprint.
• Denial of Service attacks refer to the ability for a network adversary to prevent a user from
using the anonymity network. For example, if a user must relay their traffic through a
single pre-determined node, and this node refuses to forward the user’s traffic, this attack
constitutes a denial-of-service attack.
Analysis
We now provide a summarized assessment of the security of the anonymity network designs
described in Section 3.1.1, Section 3.1.2, and Section 3.1.3 against the attacks just described.
Crowds. Because of its completely decentralized nature and hop-by-hop routing, Crowds
provides security to users only in the form of providing a single anonymity set and protection
against a malicious node refusing to relay a user’s traffic. Other attacks are trivially possible
because of the amount of influence relays have over a user’s path and the lack of protection
against an adversary observing messages passing through the network.
Salsa. Similarly to Crowds, Salsa is completely decentralized and follows a hop-by-hop
routing design. Salsa requires recursive lookups from intermediate nodes into a specific position
on a DHT to provide options to clients for the next hop. However, a malicious intermediate node
can still introduce bias to a client’s path by positioning nodes strategically in the DHT, leading
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Table 3.1: Comparison of security properties of anonymity networks and protocols
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Crowds # # # # #  
Salsa # # # # #  
ShadowWalker # # # # #  
Dandelion++ # # # # # #
Tor-based
protocols
Current Tor   # #   
Torsk   # # #  
PIR-Tor   # #   
ConsenSGX   # #   
Mix networks
MorphMix # # #  #  
Vuvuzela      #
Katzenpost   #    
Other I2P # # # #   
Walking
Onions
Telescoping   # #   
Single-Pass   # #   
to an eclipse attack. Furthermore, these recursive queries provide a fingerprintable information
leak to network observers.
ShadowWalker. Improving upon the Salsa design, ShadowWalker also follows a decentral-
ized and hop-by-hop design and uses a DHT for node lookups. While nodes gossip their routing
tables to other nodes, and the client can verify their path using lookups to other randomly cho-
sen relays, eclipse attacks remain possible by strategic positioning on behalf of the adversary.
Increasing the number of nodes to verify routes increases the capability for a denial of service
attack. Finally, as nodes have only a partial view of the network, an adversary observing the
network can distinguish routes to eventually perform end-to-end correlation by observing which
relays have been selected for a path.
Dandelion++. Offering a security model that encompasses only passive adversaries, Dande-
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lion++ protects against peer-to-peer gossip protocols in which one node can eventually connect
to all other nodes in the network and observe message flow to perform end-to-end correlation
attacks. Dandelion++ does not protect against any attacks stronger than this model, and thus
any form of node collusion or injecting packet delay or watermarking can easily result in route
capture and fingerprinting attacks. Because a message is distributed along a single “stem” and
no verification mechanism exists to ensure that a message has been distributed to the rest of the
network, a relay in the stem can drop the message without detection.
Current Tor. Because of its reliance on a globally consistent network view that is authenti-
cated by trusted authorities and source-routed path selection design, Current Tor protects against
epistemic and route capture attacks. However, because Tor is a low-latency network, an ad-
versary that can observe two ends of a client’s circuit can perform timing-based fingerprinting
attacks [BMG+07]; due to the difficulty of preventing such attacks while maintaining the low-
latency properties of the network, Tor explicitly does not protect against such attacks [Din09].
Because Tor is a free-routed network, if a relay fails to forward a user’s traffic, the user can
simply build a new circuit using a set of different relays.
Torsk. To improve the scalability of Tor, the design of Torsk moves away from a central-
ized authority approach to one where network information is distributed by a DHT. However,
each circuit extension operation requires multiple DHT lookups. Furthermore, similar to other
DHT-based designs, malicious nodes can strategically position themselves in the DHT and thus
perform route capture attacks.
PIR-Tor. Using a PIR-based design, PIR-Tor seeks to improve the scalability of Tor by
requiring clients to look up one subset of relays via a PIR query for each circuit built. PIR-
Tor maintains Tor’s existing threat model but introduces complexity for the IT-PIR design and
computational overhead for the C-PIR design.
ConsenSGX. Using a PIR design but with trusted hardware to ensure protection against
an honest-but-curious server, ConsenSGX remains within Tor’s existing threat model assuming
the trusted execution environment can be trusted. However, this assumption is undesirable in
practice, as trusted execution environments have been shown to have a number of vulnerabili-
ties [VBMW+18,RMR+21,MOG+20] and would require upgrading many Tor relays to hardware
that supports them.
MorphMix. Utilizing both a mix network and onion-routing design, MorphMix is a peer-
to-peer network in which circuits are built hop-by-hop. Malicious nodes can circumvent the
collusion detection system and thus can perform route capture attacks. Furthermore, as nodes
only have a partial view of the network, network adversaries can perform epistemic attacks by
passively observing network traffic.
Vuvuzela. Following a cascade mix network design, Vuvuzela provides higher scalability
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while limiting the anonymity set of its users to a subset of of the complete userbase. The smaller
the network, or the larger the number of subsets, the smaller a user’s anonymity set becomes.
Because each user is assigned one dead drop per network epoch, a user could experience a denial
of service when their assigned dead drop fails to perform forwarding services; in this case, the
user would have to wait until they are assigned a new dead drop in the next epoch.
Katzenpost. Implementing the Loopix mix net design, Katzenpost presents a centralized
mix network design, relying on a set of network authorities to authenticate the network directory
document for distribution to all other network participants. By both providing verifiability of
relay information and timing and cover traffic to protect message patterns en route, Katzenpost
provides a stronger security model than low-latency networks. Because users can make connec-
tions on demand with any relay in the network, if a node refuses to forward user traffic, a user
can simply attempt to send their traffic through another node. Further, as the network is globally
consistent, the user’s view is the same as all others’ view.
I2P. Because I2P is completely decentralized and does not require a single global view among
all of its users, users do not have strong assurance about the integrity of relay information that
they receive. As such, malicious relays can influence a user’s view of the network and inject
malicious relay information into the network. However, because the network is free-routed, if
one relay refuses to service a user’s request to forward traffic or send network information, the
user can simply query other network relays (assuming the user’s chosen introduction point into
the network is reliable).
Walking Onions. While we describe further how Telescoping and Single-Pass Walking
Onions compares to current Tor in Section 6.4, we include Walking Onions here to demonstrate
how it compares to other anonymity network designs in the literature. Notably, Walking Onions
maintains the same security properties as current Tor. What is not shown in Table 3.1 is how
Single-Pass moves to “windowed” forward secrecy for the choice of relays in a user’s path; we
further expand on this tradeoff in Section 6.4.
3.2 Designs For Single-Pass Circuit Creation
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, Tor currently uses a telescoping design for circuit extension; each
circuit extension requires the client to perform one round trip key exchange with the relay in
the last position of the circuit. For a client with a slow connection to the first hop in the path,
the telescoping design to extend a circuit results in additional latency even before the client can
begin downloading data from the intended destination.
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The original Onion Routing construction proposed a single-pass circuit construction tech-
nique [RSG98]. However, in this design, the client uses the relay’s long-lived public key to
derive their shared secret after generating an ephemeral key pair for their half. The client then
sends the relay their ephemeral public key to finalize the handshake, and does the same for each
hop on the path. However, while this design presents a single-pass construction, this approach
lacks forward secrecy; any adversary that compromises the relay’s long-lived secret key can de-
crypt past communication with this relay, so long as the adversary has also recorded incoming
and outgoing network traffic with this relay. For this reason, the Tor protocol today utilizes a
telescoping approach to circuit establishment [DM20] which requires relays to provide a fresh
ephemeral key for each circuit establishment, ensuring forward secrecy for client communication
at the expense of latency for the client (as further described in Section 2.2.3).
While more recent work has presented single-pass designs for anonymity networks such as
Tor, these designs have undesirable tradeoffs in either security or scalability factors. Below
we highlight past work in onion-routing designs that present a single-pass circuit establishment
design. We furthermore assess the security properties of each design and their tradeoffs between
efficiency, scalability, and security. We maintain these considerations when designing Walking
Onions and how our designs preserve scalability and security while enabling a single-pass circuit
construction protocol.
3.2.1 Early Single-Pass Designs
Øverlier and Syverson [ØS07] propose a scheme in which the user has access to an authentic
copy of every relay’s public Diffie-Hellman key from the consensus. Each circuit’s session keys
are derived from a relay’s static key and an ephemeral key provided by the client. However, this
approach compromises the forward secrecy of data exchanged over the circuit due to the use of
the relays’ static keys, and only provides eventual forward secrecy for client communication.
3.2.2 Single-Pass Designs Via Identity-Based Encryption
Kate et al. [KZG07] propose a pairing-based single-pass onion routing scheme using identity-
based encryption, in which the session key between a client and a relay is negotiated using an
ephemeral key selected by the client and the relay’s identity, resulting in a non-interactive key
agreement protocol. However, the drawback to this protocol is twofold. First, a trusted central
authority is required to distribute identity keys to all relays for each epoch, resulting in a single
point of trust that, if compromised, would result in a total compromise of the network. Second,
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the protocol does not ensure forward secrecy; compromising a node’s private key leads to the
compromise of all communication with this node.
Catalano et al. [CFG09] present a hybrid design utilizing both public key and identity-based
cryptography to limit the power of the central authority. However, both approaches require a
central trusted authority for key distribution, which is both a performance bottleneck and a fur-
ther centralization of authority. Furthermore, these schemes also lack forward secrecy for client
communication, as the node’s identity key is used to negotiate the shared session key with the
client.
Catalano et al. [CDRF+13] present a non-interactive single-pass identity-based variant, in
which the private identity keys of relays are ratcheted forward without requiring public key ro-
tation, thereby allowing forward secrecy without periodic interaction with a central authority.
However, compromise of a secret identity key leads to the total compromise of all future private
keys and consequently client traffic. Furthermore, while ongoing key rotation is non-interactive
and does not require communication with a central PKI, nodes bootstrapping to the network
must still request their initial credential from a trusted central credential distributor. However,
such a design is undesirable for anonymity networks seeking to decentralize trust as well as limit
performance bottlenecks.
3.2.3 Single-Pass Designs Via Sphinx
In addition to the aforementioned tradeoffs, the above designs also do not defend against adver-
saries performing bitwise linking attacks using observed public key material exposed in transit.
Any adversary observing the network could correlate incoming and outgoing packets simply by
observing the client’s ephemeral public key and each relay’s long-lived public key during key
negotiation.
Sphinx [DG09] presents a packet format for anonymity networks, providing bitwise unlink-
ability for public key material that is exposed in incoming and outgoing network packets during
the key-establishment stage for circuit construction. The session key for each node on a cir-
cuit constructed using the Sphinx packet format is computed from the server’s private key and a
blinded element initially provided by the client and re-blinded at each hop, serving as the public
key for the next hop and thus ensuring unlinkability of public key material between hops. As
each intermediate relay contributes to this blinding factor before sending it to the next hop, only
the client and this relay can derive the corresponding session key. Notably, protocols using the
Sphinx packet format do not require intermediaries to interact with the client in order to derive
blinding keys for the next hop in the path. As such, onion routing protocols can capitalize on this
capability to build single-pass variants.
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In its original work, the design of Sphinx included a proof of secure routing using a proof
strategy first developed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL05], by proving the Sphinx design
as indistinguishable to an adversary from an idealized onion-routing protocol. However, a more
recent work by Kuhn, Beck, and Strufe [KBS20] demonstrate flaws in this proof strategy, thereby
demonstrating that the idealized definition of onion routing [CL05] lacks or incorrectly defines
important security properties. As such, the authors propose additional security properties and
prove that a simplified variant of Sphinx satisfies their proposed security notions.
Kate and Goldberg [KG10] assess the security and efficiency of a range of onion-routing
schemes presented in the literature when Sphinx is used as the underlying packet format. The
schemes evaluated in this assessment include Tor-preDH, the half-certified DH agreement using
a relay’s long-lived public key [ØS07], pairing-based onion routing [KZG07], and Certificateless
Onion Routing [CFG09]. Unfortunately, undesired tradeoffs remain with each construction. For
example, each scheme at best provides for eventual forward secrecy for client communication.
In the case of Tor-preDH, each key rotation epoch requires every relay on the network to send
a fresh keypair to the directory authorities, creating a heavy burden on the network for each key
rotation period. Furthermore, the use of Sphinx as the underlying packet format does not remove
the requirement for a centralized system to generate and assign private keys—as is required by
identity-based encryption schemes—and consequently retains undesirable tradeoffs.
While Sphinx provides a promising building block to constructing a single-pass circuit con-
struction protocol for an onion-routed network, the lack of forward secrecy for client communi-
cation in prior designs presents an undesirable tradeoff between efficiency and security. We will
construct Walking Onions to improve upon past designs to achieve the best of both worlds, al-
lowing circuits to be built with lower latency than in telescoping designs while while preserving
forward secrecy of client communication.
3.3 Summary
In seeking to provide a more efficient mechanism for users to select paths through an anonymity
network, Walking Onions will also need to protect against path-routing and epistemic attacks
by ensuring users’ selection of relays is indistinguishable to a network adversary, as well as
ensuring that users can verify the integrity of their selected paths. Furthermore, Walking Onions
will need to maintain forward secrecy of client communication during circuit establishment even
in a single-pass setting. Moreover, the Walking Onions design should not introduce additional
centralization into the network, as additional network centralization poses both a security and
performance risk.
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Even while preserving the above-mentioned security properties, Walking Onions will need
to do so while improving the scalability of the network to minimize the amount of network
information clients are required to maintain even as new relays join the network. The benefit to
improving the scalability of anonymity networks is twofold: users of these networks both enjoy
a larger anonymity set, while also providing the opportunity for more users to make use of these
networks and consequently improve their privacy online. As such, scalability is a critical feature
that should be preserved even while maintaining security against known network attacks.
Next, we will present the design of Walking Onions, discuss the threat model and goals of
the protocol, and demonstrate how Walking Onions improves over prior related work in order to




To address the scalability of Tor and similar anonymity networks, we present Walking Onions,
a set of novel protocols and algorithms to allow clients to obliviously select relays for paths
through the network and establish secure circuits with these relays. Our design protects against
route capture and epistemic attacks, and does not require clients to maintain information about
the complete state of the network.
In this chapter, we discuss the intended threat model of Walking Onions, present scalability
and security goals for the protocol, and review key insights to our work. In Section 4.1, we
present the threat model for Tor and subsequently for our work as well, as well as discuss the
concept of a network authority and how such an authority can be instantiated in practice. In
Section 4.2, we discuss the scalability and security goals for Walking Onions, against which we
evaluate our proposed protocols later in this work. Finally, we review key insights that influenced
the design of Walking Onions in Section 4.3.
4.1 Threat Model
We assume the threat model of the Tor network [DMS04]; see that work for more details. As
an overview, Tor’s threat model assumes independently operated relays of which a subset can be
malicious but the majority are not. As such, a malicious relay is not bound to operate under any
certain protocol and can behave arbitrarily. Furthermore, the threat model includes adversaries
who can observe only a subset of network traffic. Outside of this threat model are end-to-end
attacks where the adversary can observe information at both edges of the network where specific
messages enter and leave, such as timing or volume of packets.
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This threat model assumes the anonymity network has a root of trust to produce authenticated
network directory documents. We refer to this trust anchor as the authority. The instantiation
of this authority can vary, so long as its output is verifiable and trusted by all participants. For
example, the authority may be distributed among several voters who participate jointly. In Tor,
the authority is a set of directory authorities, of which a threshold number are assumed to be hon-
est [Tor20a]. Walking Onions can also support alternative consensus mechanisms for anonymity
networks other than Tor, such as verifiably selecting at random a subset of nodes to generate the
network directory document. If the anonymity network is completely decentralized (i.e., no en-
tity holds complete information about the network), another possible authentication mechanism




As additional clients join the network, a proportional number of relays is typically needed to
provide sufficient bandwidth. For scalability, we require that even as the number of relays grows,
the cost to clients in bandwidth and memory remains constant. We later show a relaxation of
this requirement to allow for logarithmic growth for clients, in order to improve bandwidth for
relays (see our performance evaluation in Chapter 8). Further, we require that the latency (in
terms of round trips) experienced by a client to establish a new circuit is no worse—and ideally
better—than current onion-routing protocols.
4.2.2 Security Goals
We require our designs to fulfill the following security properties:
Correctness. The client must be able to establish a valid circuit through the network; a valid
circuit entails that each relay is selected corresponding to the client’s path requirements,
and corresponds to a valid entry in the current network directory document produced by
the authority for the anonymity network. Furthermore, clients must be able to establish a
secure shared session key with each relay on the circuit.
Security. The client must be able to verify that the selection of relays on its path has not been in-
fluenced by an intermediary in such a way as to result in epistemic or route capture attacks.
38
More specifically, the client must be able to ensure that the relays selected for the client’s
path were selected at random from a given distribution, and that the distribution itself has
not been maliciously modified or influenced. Finally, we require that a malicious relay
acting in isolation cannot compromise a client’s security or ability to access the network.
Privacy. A user’s participation in an anonymity network remains private so long as a network
adversary with a limited view of the network [DMS04] cannot gain useful information
about the user from observing traffic. By a limited network view, we assume that the
adversary cannot simultaneously observe connections for a single user both entering and
exiting the network, as otherwise the adversary could perform end-to-end traffic corre-
lation. Furthermore, an adversary monitoring incoming and outgoing traffic for a specific
relay should not be able to perform a linking attack by comparing exposed packet contents.
4.3 Key Insights
Walking Onions uses the following key insights to scale anonymity networks:
Oblivious path selection. In Walking Onions, clients do not maintain a list of relays. Instead,
to build a path through the network, a uniform random integer i from a fixed range is selected
either by the client directly, or at least in a manner provably uninfluenceable by any intermediary.
This i serves as an index into a probability distribution generated by the authority over the relays
with properties required for that path. After later learning the relay corresponding to i, the client
will verify that it was in fact chosen correctly. So long as the client can reliably validate that the
resulting relay corresponds to i, the client does not need any relay information beforehand.
Post-hoc identity verification. As a second insight, we note that to extend a circuit to a given
relay, some cryptographic handshakes—such as one-way authenticated handshakes based on
Diffie-Hellman [GSU12]—can be easily modified to not require knowledge of the other party’s
public key up front. Notably, a client can initialize a cryptographic handshake with a relay by
sending only their own ephemeral public key, and verifying the relay’s public key material after
the relay has responded.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we present an overview of factors important to understanding the design and
intent of Walking Onions. We review the threat model of Walking Onions, which corresponds
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to Tor’s current threat model as well. Further, we discuss the assumption that the anonymity
network implementing Walking Onions maintains an authority acting as a root of trust for the
network. We present both scalability goals and security goals that we later use to evaluate Walk-
ing Onions path-selection and circuit establishment protocols. Finally, we present key insights
that are important to the overall design of Walking Onions. Notably, these insights tell us that so
long as clients can verify the identity of relays selected for their circuit even after the circuit has
been built—and be assured of the randomness of their relay selection—then the resulting circuits
preserve similar security properties as existing circuit-establishment designs.
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Chapter 5
Distributing Network Information in
Walking Onions
In this chapter, we present efficient encoding and distribution mechanisms for network directory
information in anonymity networks implementing Walking Onions.
We begin by outlining notation and terminology used to define our work in Section 5.1. We
then introduce how network directory documents are encoded and distributed in Walking Onions
in Section 5.2. We conclude by introducing in Section 5.3 several mechanisms for efficiently
authenticating network directory information by the network authority.
5.1 Notation and Terminology
Let α be an integer that determines the precision with which we can represent node selection
probabilities. Relays will be selected via random integers i with 0 ≤ i < α. We recommend
α = 232.
A network directory document is an authenticated document made up of information repre-
senting all relays, such as their cryptographic identity keys and IP addresses. These directories
are regenerated once every epoch.1 A network parameters document is a constant-sized au-
thenticated document that includes information such as supported protocol versions and network
parameters. Such a document is used in practice, for example, to coordinate all clients to switch
to a new protocol at the same time, to avoid fragmenting the clients’ anonymity set.
1For comparison, the length of an epoch in Tor is one hour.
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A path through the network is an ordered list of relays. A circuit represents the cryptographic
instantiation of the path, in which the client shares a different set of negotiated session keys with
each relay in the path.
5.2 Encoding Network Directory Documents
In the Walking Onions design, once every epoch, the network authority generates an authenti-
cated network directory document reflecting the current state of all relays. We call the authen-
ticated network directory document an Efficient Network Directory with Individually Verifiable
Entries, or ENDIVE. We call each entry in the ENDIVE a Separable Network Index Proof, or
SNIP. Each SNIP corresponds to a single relay; consequently, the ENDIVE comprises the com-
plete set of all SNIPs.
5.2.1 ENDIVEs
Importantly, in Walking Onions, only relays need to download ENDIVEs. If the anonymity
network requires all participants to download a constant-sized network parameters document,
clients are required to download only this document once per network epoch in order to build
circuits. Relays are required to fetch the entire ENDIVE at bootstrap; afterwards, relays fetch
only updated SNIPs once per epoch.
Each ENDIVE contains the set of all valid SNIPs for the epoch and an authentication tag
over this set. We describe options to generate this authentication tag in Section 5.3.
Alternative topologies. For simplicity, in this work we assume a full clique network topol-
ogy; that is, that any relay can connect to any other relay. However, Walking Onions is applicable
to alternative topologies by issuing multiple ENDIVEs, in which a pre-determined partitioning
scheme could assign relays to a specific ENDIVE. Such an approach could be used to integrate
Walking Onions into mix networks like Katzenpost [ADD+17], which relies upon a stratified
topology, in which relays are partitioned into distinct layers and client paths contain one relay
per layer.
5.2.2 SNIPs
In anonymity networks, a relay entry represents the information about a single relay distributed
in a network directory document. A relay entry includes routing information about the relay
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such as its public keys, IP address(es), and properties such as supported features or versions.
As described in Section 2.2, networks such as Tor distribute a network directory document that
includes the set of relay entries that are valid for the current epoch and a signature over the entire
document.
SNIPs differ from relay entries by including three extra fields in addition to the fields included
in a relay entry.
First, each SNIP includes an index range: a range of integer values whose size is proportional
to the probability of selecting this relay. When generating the ENDIVE for the next network
epoch, the network authority computes and assigns index ranges for each SNIP included in the
ENDIVE. As we describe further in Chapter 6, these index ranges enable clients to indicate
which relay to extend their circuit to without maintaining the ENDIVE locally.
Second, each SNIP includes its own authentication tag generated by the network authority
over only the content in the SNIP (we describe several options to perform this authentication in
Section 5.3). Third, each SNIP includes two timestamps indicating the epochs when the SNIP
was created and when the SNIP expires.
Because SNIPs are individually authenticated and include these additional fields, clients can
validate SNIPs independently without downloading the entire ENDIVE. We describe how clients
build upon this capability to security perform path selection and circuit extension in Chapter 6.
Weighted Relay Selection
Often, selection of relays occurs over a distribution weighted by some relay property, such as how
much bandwidth the relay provides to the network. We address this and a range of additional
complex path selection cases in Chapter 7, but note here one mechanism to select relays based
on their fulfillment of a single property, such as the relay’s available bandwidth, is to assign each
relay’s index range using a weighted probability distribution. In doing so, the probability that the
relay will be chosen by the client depends on its respective weight.
We next describe an example algorithm in more detail that the network authority can perform
in order to assign index ranges to each SNIP to be included in an ENDIVE.
Computing Index Ranges
Assume a set of relays R and a desired probability distribution P over R. First, discard all relays
Ri ∈ R for which P (·) = 0. Let N denote the remaining relays where P (Ri) 6= 0. Next,




Ci can be transformed into a discrete representation by computing C ′i = bCi · αc. Each relay
Ri is assigned the index range [C ′i−1, C
′
i − 1]; the endpoints of this range are placed in relay Ri’s
SNIP.
5.3 Authenticating ENDIVEs and SNIPs
To facilitate the ability for clients to verify SNIPs during circuit construction without requiring
the complete ENDIVE, each SNIP has an authentication tag produced by the network authority
over the information only within the SNIP. We now survey several authentication mechanisms
first introduced in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, and evaluate the performance of each in Section 8.4.2.
One signature per voter. When the authority for an anonymity network comprises multiple
voters, one simple solution is to include one signature from each voter in each SNIP. In this case,
the number of signatures in the ENDIVE is equal to NVNR, where NV represents the number of
signing voters and NR represents the number of relays.
Aggregate/Threshold Signatures. Joint signatures, in which a single signature represents
n signers, offer an attractive option for authenticating ENDIVEs and SNIPs in Walking Onions,
as multiple signing voters can coordinate to issue a single authentication tag. Aggregate sig-
natures [BGLS03b, BDN18, MPSW19] provide an n-out-of-n scheme in which all voters must
participate to produce a joint signature, while threshold signatures [BLS04] provide a t-out-of-n
trust model, requiring only a threshold number of voters to produce the signature.
In comparison to other signing mechanisms, threshold signatures offer a compelling alter-
native when the authority for an anonymity network comprises multiple voters, yet a subset of
these voters may be offline at any time.
Merkle Proofs. Another authentication approach includes Merkle proofs [Mer88] to ensure
a specific SNIP is within the ENDIVE signed by the authority. A client can download the Merkle
root hash for the most-recent ENDIVE in the (constant-sized) network parameters document that
itself is authenticated by the authority. During circuit construction, the client receives a Merkle
proof along with the SNIP to prove inclusion of the SNIP in the ENDIVE, demonstrating a path
from the SNIP to the Merkle root. Note that these proofs can be constructed by relays locally
and consequently do not require distribution in the ENDIVE itself.
Merkle proofs are particularly attractive for bandwidth savings because of the small amount
of new information required for relays to maintain an up-to-date ENDIVE. With the other mech-
anisms, a relay needs to download an new signature for each SNIP every epoch, whether the
SNIP’s information has changed or not: the timestamp will have changed and the signatures thus
44
cannot be reused. But with a Merkle proof, the relay can download only the bodies of SNIPs that
have changed, plus one unpredictable signature for the tree’s root. (The non-leaf, non-root nodes
of the Merkle tree can be recomputed, and do not need to be downloaded.)
The savings in relay downloads with Merkle proofs, however, is offset by the increased size
in SNIPs: they now must contain dlgNRe digests, where NR is the total number of relays in the
ENDIVE. We examine this tradeoff more in Section 8.2.1.
Authenticating ENDIVEs. Because ENDIVEs are simply the set of SNIPs valid for the
current epoch, a relay can validate the integrity of an ENDIVE by verifying the authentication
tag for each SNIP in the ENDIVE, and ensuring that every SNIP has been included in the EN-
DIVE. However, a more efficient mechanism is to include an additional authentication tag over
the ENDIVE as a whole, for relays to validate after downloading the most recent ENDIVE. Con-
ventional mechanisms can be used for this purpose, such as the one-per-voter signing strategy,
as the overhead for signatures is negligible in comparison to the document size.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we begin by introducing important notation and terminology used in our work.
Following, we present encoding techniques for network directory documents to enable Walking
Onions path-selection and circuit extension protocols. After presenting the concept of ENDIVEs
and SNIPs, we discuss how to generate and distribute ENDIVEs such that each relay maintains
a copy of the most up-to-date ENDIVE. Furthermore, we discuss how Walking Onions can be
used in alternative network topologies other than a fully connected network. We conclude with
a review of several authentication mechanisms for ENDIVEs and SNIPs using the network au-
thority as the root of trust, such that each SNIP can be validated independently of the ENDIVE
as a whole.
Next, we examine how Walking Onions can use ENDIVEs and SNIPs to construct efficient
path-selection and circuit-establishment protocols through an onion-routed anonymity network.
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Chapter 6
Walking Onions Path Selection and Circuit
Extension
In this chapter, we introduce additional preliminaries to our work, and then present Walking
Onions path-selection and circuit-establishment protocols. We conclude by assessing the per-
formance and security tradeoffs of these protocols against Vanilla Onion Routing, a generalized
onion-routing protocol that we use for comparison and evaluation purposes.
We begin by introducing notation and terminology in Section 6.1. We then present two
protocol variants of Walking Onions, which provide clients with the ability to obliviously yet
verifiably select relays and extend circuits through anonymity networks. We call the first variant
Telescoping Walking Onions, and present this work in Section 6.2. We call the second variant
Single-Pass Walking Onions, and present it in Section 6.3. We discuss the performance and
security tradeoffs of each protocol relative to Vanilla Onion Routing in Section 6.4. Finally, we
present a hybrid protocol between Telescoping and Single-Pass Walking Onions in Section 6.5
and mechanisms to bootstrap the first connection in any of the Walking Onions protocols in
Section 6.6.
6.1 Preliminaries




Walking Onions presents efficient path selection and circuit extension protocols, but assumes the
client holds trustworthy information about the first hop. We discuss several secure mechanisms
to establish the first hop in a circuit in Section 6.6.
6.1.2 Authenticated key exchange
We assume the existence of a one-way-authenticated two-party key exchange with post-specified
peer, in which the initiator authenticates the responder after both supply ephemeral keys. We
follow a similar approach to Canetti and Krawczyk [CK02] by assuming the idealized function-
ality of such a protocol with similar assumptions. As part of this idealized authenticated key
exchange, we assume the following functions:
KeyGenAuth(1
λ) → (x, gx): Generates an ephemeral private/public keypair with security pa-
rameter λ.
ComputeSecretAndAuth(gx, y, b) → (S,A): Computes the shared secret S and a value A
used to authenticate the relay using the relay’s long-lived private key b and ephemeral
private key y, along with the client’s ephemeral public value gx.
ComputeSecretAndV alidate(x, gy, gb, A) → (S, {0, 1}): Performed by the client during a
client/relay handshake during circuit establishment. Computes the shared secret value,
and authenticates the resulting value using the peer’s long-lived public key. Outputs the
shared secret S and a Boolean value indicating if the handshake is valid.
6.1.3 Verifiable Random Functions
Single-Pass Walking Onions uses an idealized version of a Verifiable Random Function similar
to the VRF standard submitted to the IETF for review [GRPV19]. We require the following VRF
operations:
KeyGenV RF (1
λ)→ (c, gc): Generates a private/public keypair with security parameter λ.
Prove(c, τ)→ (β, π): Computes a deterministic output β and a proof π, given the VRF private
key c and an input τ .
Verify(gc, β, τ, π) → {0, 1}: Verifies the correctness of the VRF output using the VRF public
key gc. Outputs a Boolean value indicating if the proof is valid.
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6.1.4 Vanilla Onion Routing
We describe our protocols with reference to a generic Tor-like onion-routing protocol. We call it
Vanilla Onion Routing, and include a detailed protocol definition in Figure 6.1.4.
We use Vanilla Onion Routing as a generalized onion routing protocol upon which to build
or modify for Walking Onions path selection and circuit extension protocols. In doing so, we
can more easily identify where Walking Onions remains the same or departs from general onion
routing protocols.
As in our next sections, we identify stages in the protocol as referring to either key exchange
or path extension operations. K denotes a key exchange operation, and P denotes a path extension
operation. Path extension and circuit establishment are distinct operations but performed jointly
(e.g, in the same protocol stage).
6.2 Telescoping Walking Onions
We now present Telescoping Walking Onions, a protocol to extend an existing circuit by a single
hop, and describe the protocol using a step-by-step approach in Definition 1.
Description of protocol. Let Rn represent the last relay in the client’s current circuit, and
Rn+1 represent the relay the client will extend the circuit to.
To extend a circuit in Telescoping Walking Onions, instead of selecting a next hop Rn+1
directly, the client selects a random index i such that 0 ≤ i < α. This index will fall within an
index range in the most recent ENDIVE, as described in Section 5.2. The client sends i to the last
relayRn in their circuit, along with the client’s half of the circuit extension handshake. To find the
next relay to extend the circuit to,Rn looks up the client’s chosen i in the ENDIVE for the current
epoch, obtaining the unqiue SNIP whose index range contains i; this SNIP Σn+1 corresponds to
the relay that will become Rn+1. The relay Rn starts by relaying the client’s handshake in a
circuit extension request to Rn+1. Upon receiving the response handshake from Rn+1, Rn relays
that response to the client, along with Σn+1. The client verifies Σn+1 is authentic and valid (see
Section 5.3). Further, the client verifies that Rn+1 was selected honestly, by checking that i falls
within the index range for the SNIP. Finally, the client uses the public keys for Rn+1 in the SNIP
to authenticate the handshake response from Rn+1.
We present Telescoping Walking Onions in Definition 1, building upon a generalized circuit
extension protocol.
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Let (bn, gbn) denote the long-term key for relay Rn.
When the client extends an existing circuit:
1. Select a random next relay Rn+1.
2. [K] Generate an ephemeral keypair
(x, gx)← KeyGenAuth(1λ).
3. [P,K] Send (Rn+1, gx) to Rn over the existing circuit.
When Rn receives a circuit extension request (Rn+1, gx):
4. [P] Ensure a connection exists to Rn+1.
5. [K] Send the client’s gx to Rn+1
6. [P, K] Wait for a response from Rn+1, and send it to the client.
When Rn+1 receives the circuit extension request gx:
7. [K] Generate an ephemeral keypair (y, gy) ← KeyGenAuth(1λ); compute the shared
secret and authentication value
(S,A)← ComputeSecretAndAuth(gx, y, bn+1).
8. [K] Reply with (gy, A); derive circuit keys from S.
When the client receives a reply indicating the circuit was extended:
9. [P] Look up the long-term key gb for Rn+1 locally.
10. [K] Complete the handshake: Compute
(S, V ) ← ComputeSecretAndV alidate(x, gy, gbn+1 , A). If V = 0, abort; otherwise,
derive circuit keys from S.
Figure 6.1: Vanilla Onion Routing Protocol
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Definition 1. (Telescoping Walking Onions) We label each step with P to denote a path selec-
tion operation, and K to denote a key exchange operation for circuit extension. Steps that differ
from Vanilla Onion Routing (see Section 6.1.4) are underlined for emphasis.
Let (bn, gbn) denote the long-term key for relay Rn.
When the client extends an existing circuit:
1. [P] Select 0 ≤ i < α uniformly at random.
2. [K] Generate an ephemeral keypair
(x, gx)← KeyGenAuth(1λ).
3. [P,K] Send (i, gx) to Rn over the existing circuit.
When Rn receives a circuit extension request (i, gx):
4. [P] Obtain the SNIP Σn+1 whose index range contains i in the most recent ENDIVE. This
determines the relay that will serve as Rn+1.
5. [K] Send the client’s gx to Rn+1.
6. [P, K] Wait for a response from Rn+1, and send it to the client, along with Σn+1.
When Rn+1 receives the circuit extension request gx:
7. [K] Generate an ephemeral keypair (y, gy)← KeyGenAuth(1λ); compute the shared secret
and authentication value
(S,A)← ComputeSecretAndAuth(gx, y, bn+1).
8. [K] Reply with (gy, A); derive circuit keys from S.
When the client receives a reply indicating the circuit was extended:
9. [P] Verify the received SNIP Σn+1 is timely and corresponds to the chosen i. Verify the au-
thentication tag included in Σn+1. If the SNIP is not valid, abort. Otherwise, extract gbn+1
from Σn+1.
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10. [K] Complete the handshake: Compute
(S, V ) ← ComputeSecretAndV alidate(x, gy, gbn+1 , A). If V 6= 1, abort; otherwise,
derive circuit keys from S.
Scalability Goals. Telescoping Walking Onions fulfills the scalability goals described in
Section 4.2 as clients do not need to maintain the complete network directory document. It
also maintains the same latency overhead for clients during circuit construction as Vanilla Onion
Routing, as the network traffic pattern is the same.
6.2.1 Analysis of Security Goals
Correctness: To maintain correctness, Telescoping Walking Onions must ensure that each relay
corresponds to the value i provided by the client. Because each SNIP contains an index range,
along with an authentication tag, the client can validate that their choice of i falls within the
relay’s index range and that the SNIP is generated by the authority for the anonymity network.
Furthermore, the client can check the timeliness of the SNIP to ensure the SNIP is valid for the
current epoch.
Security: To prevent the attacks described in Section 2.3, Telescoping Walking Onions must
ensure a client can validate that their path has not been influenced by an intermediary. As pre-
viously established, a client can validate their choice of i corresponds to the SNIP of the relay
selected for the path. Furthermore, as i can be selected from the full distribution range up to
α, the client can select any SNIP in the ENDIVE. Consequently, a malicious on-path relay or
intermediary cannot constrain the client to select Rn+1 from only a subset of all available re-
lays. Finally, while a malicious on-path relay can arbitrarily drop client connections to perform
a denial-of-service attack [BDMT07], this behaviour is no worse than existing onion-routed net-
works, and the client can simply build another circuit using freshly selected relays.
Privacy: To prevent information leakage to an observer, messages sent in the clear must be
unlinkable. (We consider only bitwise unlinkability in our analysis, as protecting against timing-
based correlation is outside the scope of our threat model.) As the client selects a fresh randomly
generated (i, gx) for each extension of the circuit, an intermediate node will not be able to derive
any further information about other relays in the path (beyond the nodes immediately preceding
and following). Furthermore, as the client’s messages containing (i, gx) are encrypted within the
circuit connection between the client and Rn, an adversary observing the network will not be
able to link the client and the circuit extension request sent from Rn to Rn+1.
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6.3 Single-Pass Walking Onions
While Telescoping Walking Onions presents minimal protocol changes to an existing onion-
routing network, it also requires the same number of messages to iteratively create a new circuit
as Vanilla Onion Routing (a generalized protocol presented in Section 6.1.4). We now present
Single-Pass Walking Onions, a path-selection and circuit establishment protocol that enables the
same scalability benefits as Telescoping Walking Onions, but requires only a linear number of
total messages relative to the path length. Further, the client only sends one and receives one
message when building a new circuit, which is of particular benefit for clients with high-latency
connections. The key insight to Single-Pass Walking Onions is this: if the client can be assured
that i was selected uniformly at random, then the client does not need to select i directly; this
responsibility can be shared with intermediate relays in the circuit so long as the client can verify
the choice of i was not selectively influenced by any intermediary.
Building upon this insight, we will now describe how this random index i is generated in
Single-Pass Walking Onions in such a way that the client can verify no intermediary has influ-
enced it. To start, the client generates an ephemeral path-selection keypair (d, gd), and sends
its public value D = gd to the first hop in the circuit (as aforementioned, we assume the first
hop in the circuit is already bootstrapped). Each relay Rj holds a semi-ephemeral path-selection
keypair (cj, gcj). Recall from before that each relay maintains a long-lived key (bj, gbj). The
index i is derived using contributions from both the client and the relay, such that relay’s contri-
bution remains fixed within a single epoch to prevent the relay from manipulating its input after
observing the client’s input. The first hop Rj calculates (i, π) = Prove(cj, Dbj)—relay Rj’s
VRF output (using its semi-ephemeral key cj) corresponding to the input Dbj , which itself is the
Diffie-Hellman shared secret between the client’s (d,D) and the relay’s long-term key. Relay Rj
then blinds D using the Sphinx [DG09] technique: it computes a blinding value vj = H(Dbj)
and changes D to Dvj before passing it along to the relay selected by i.
We further assess security properties of Single-Pass Walking Onions in Section 6.3.1, but note
here that the relay’s path selection key is semi-ephemeral to prevent relays from brute-forcing a
favourable i by continuously re-generating path-selection keypairs. Further, we bind knowledge
of the path-selection key to the relay’s long-lived key using the VRF.
This technique of reblinding the client’s public key at each hop using a shared secret key as
the blinding factor was first introduced by Sphinx [DG09], and results in the client (and only
the client) having the capability to derive the corresponding private key. In this way, Single-Pass
Walking Onions departs from Vanilla Onion Routing and Telescoping Walking Onions by not
requiring an iterative circuit establishment approach.
Scalability Goals. As with Telescoping Walking Onions, Single-Pass Walking Onions ful-
52
fills the scalability goals described in Section 4.2 as clients do not require the complete network
directory document. Furthermore, in Single-Pass Walking Onions, clients experience only a
single round trip, which can be significant if the client has a high-latency connection.
Description of protocol. We first describe additional several key points required to under-
stand Single-Pass Walking Onions, and then present the protocol in more detail in Definition 2,
building upon a generalized circuit extension protocol.
To prevent a relay from biasing path-selection towards favourable (for example, colluding) re-
lays, we require each relay to publish their path-selection public key in their SNIP, consequently
binding the relay to this key for as long as the SNIP is valid. If a relay is compromised and an
adversary learns its private path-selection key, we ensure eventual forward secrecy for clients’
path selection by requiring path-selection keys to be rotated periodically. Because fresh key are
generated for each key rotation, compromise of a past path-selection key will not impact future
keys. Such a “windowing” approach to forward secrecy is well established for privacy protocols
in practice [PM16, UG15], and allows for a slight relaxation in forward secrecy in exchange for
improved performance or functionality.
To indicate when circuit extension should terminate, the client will also send a TTL integer
value θ along with sending gx and gd. Each hop on the circuit will decrement θ by one. The relay
that receives θ = 0 will be the final relay, and will not extend the circuit further. Note that while
θ is sent in cleartext, the adversary has less advantage from productively using this information
as the network size and number of participating clients grows.
Definition 2. (Single-Pass Walking Onions) As before, we label each step with P to denote a
path selection operation, and K to denote a key exchange operation for circuit extension. Let n
denote the desired length of the circuit. Recall that the client begins with authenticated informa-
tion about the relay R1 (see Section 6.6).
Let (bj, gbj) denote the long-term key and (cj, gcj) ← KeyGenV RF (1λ) denote a path-
selection keypair (rotated periodically) for the j th relay in a given path, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Let H denote a cryptographic hash mapping to Z∗q , where q is the prime order of the group
generated by g.
When the client initializes a circuit:
1. [K] Generate an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keypair (x, gx)← KeyGenAuth(1λ). This key
will be used for deriving circuit-related session keys.
2. [P] Generate another ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keypair (d, gd)← KeyGenAuth(1λ). This
key will be used for deriving path-related VRF inputs.
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3. [P] Select a circuit extension time to live (TTL) θ = n − 1, where n is the desired circuit
length
4. [P, K] Send (gx, gd, θ) to R1
When Rj (j ≥ 1) receives a circuit extension request (X,D, θ > 0), where X and D are the
iteratively reblinded versions of the client’s original gx and gd public keys:
5. [K] Calculate an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman circuit keypair (yj, gyj) ← KeyGenAuth(1λ);
compute the circuit shared secret and authentication value
(Sj, Aj)← ComputeSecretAndAuth(X, yj, bj)
6. [P] Derive the VRF output (βj+1, πj+1) ← Prove(cj, Dbj) using the relay’s path-selection
private key cj and private key bj . Obtain ij+1 = βj+1 mod α to determine the next relay in
the path Rj+1 within the required index range.
7. [P] Obtain the SNIP Σj+1 whose index range contains ij+1 in the most recent ENDIVE.
This determines the relay that will serve as Rj+1.
8. [P] Compute the blinding value for the circuit public key rj ← H(Sj)
9. [P] Compute the blinding value for the VRF input vj ← H(Dbj)
10. [P, K] Send (Xrj , Dvj , θ − 1) to the next relay Rj+1
11. [P, K] Wait for a response ρj+1 from Rj+1; reply to the circuit extension request with
ρj = (g
yj , Aj, Ej[Σj+1, βj+1, πj+1, ρj+1]), where Ej is authenticated encryption with cir-
cuit keys derived from Sj .
When Rn receives a circuit extension request (X,D, 0):
12. [K] Generate an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman circuit keypair (yn, gyn) ← KeyGenAuth(1λ);
compute the circuit shared secret and authentication value
(Sn, An)← ComputeSecretAndAuth(X, yn, bn)
13. [K] Reply with ρn = (gyn , An), and derive circuit keys from Sn.
Recall that the client knows gb1 and gc1 , as above. When the client receives a reply indicating the
circuit has been constructed, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, do:
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yj , gbj , Aj), aborting if Vj 6= 1. (Note that the
product simply evaluates to 1 if j = 1.) Derive circuit keys from Sj . If j = n, stop here;
the circuit was successfully built.
15. Compute the VRF input as τj = (gbj)δj , where δj = d ·
∏j−1
k=1 vk, and compute the blinding
value vj = H(τj). (Recall d was chosen in Step 2.)
16. [K] Decrypt the remainder of ρj using the circuit keys. Abort if the decryption fails or if
Verify(gcj , βj+1, τj, πj+1) 6= 1. Otherwise compute the blinding value rj ← H(Sj).
17. [P] Verify the SNIP’s authentication tag Σj+1 and that its index range contains (βj+1 mod
α), aborting if not.
18. [K] Extract gbj+1 and gcj+1 from Σj+1.
6.3.1 Analysis of Security Goals
Correctness: While the client does not directly select the next relay for the circuit, the client does
receive proof that the relay was selected at random according to the desired relay distribution,
and that the selection was generated using the client’s original randomly selected ephemeral gx
and the relays’ long-term and path-selection keys.
Security: As with Telescoping Walking Onions, so long as each relay on the path is selected
from a random distribution in a way that only depends on the client’s choice of randomness (and
not a specially crafted value from an intermediary), the client can be assured that no intermediary
has influenced their path selection. Here, it is important that each relay’s path-selection key is
committed to in the SNIP corresponding to that relay before the relay is ever sent the client’s
ephemeral key material, so that the relay cannot bias the VRF output. Furthermore, clients are
protected against epistemic attacks, as all clients select any given relay with the same probability.
Finally, while a malicious relay can perform a denial-of-service attack by refusing to select the
next relay in the path [BDMT07], this is no worse than in existing onion routing schemes where
on-path relays refuse client connections; in these cases, the client can simply build a new circuit
with other relays.
Privacy: As Single-Pass Walking Onions uses the Sphinx reblinding technique to modify
the client’s public key material seen by each hop on the path, an intermediary with access to all
messages passing through the anonymity network will not be able to bitwise correlate public key
material for separate hops in the same circuit. Furthermore, only the client (with knowledge of
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their private key d) can derive the VRF input for all hops in the path, so long as the relays’ private
keys are not compromised (and the relays do not collude).
6.3.2 Performance Optimizations for Single-Pass
Key Binding Using Signatures
While Definition 2 uses a VRF to bind a relay’s path selection key gcj to its long-term key gbj ,
other techniques exist that can achieve the same security goal. We now describe an alternative
approach and assess the performance tradeoffs.
Most straightforwardly, at the time each relay uploads its information to the network authority
to be included in the ENDIVE for the next network epoch, this relay can also include signatures
for both its long-lived key and path-selection keys. Doing so proves to the network authority
that the relay who has knowledge of the private key for the long-lived key also has knowledge
of the private key for the path-selection key, avoiding key-misbinding attacks in the future. De-
pending on the desired level of trust in the network authority, these signatures can be included
in the relay’s SNIP for the client to verify during circuit-construction time, or simply verified by
the network authority before publishing the ENDIVE (but not directly included). During circuit
establishment time, expensive VRF computations can thus be avoided, as the index into the EN-
DIVE can be derived by calculating a shared Diffie-Hellman secret using the client’s ephemeral
path-selection key d, gd and the relay’s path-selection key cj, gcj .
This shared key (derived via the client’s ephemeral path-selection key and the relay’s semi-
ephemeral path-selection key) could also be used as a key for a Pseudo-Random function (PRF).
However, the input into the PRF would need to be deterministic so that both the client and the
relay can derive the same output, and also not influenceable by the relay. One option is using a
hash of the client’s message as input into the PRF, for example.
The tradeoff between using VRFs at circuit-build time or signatures over the path-selection
key during compilation of the ENDIVe for the next network epoch is between trust in the author-
ity and bandwidth and computational cost. The least costly option for overall performance is the
option that also requires the most trust in the network authority, by requiring the authority ver-
ify signatures without publishing these signatures in the relay’s SNIP. However, a misbehaving
authority could fail to correctly perform this verification step without detection. Using VRFs for
key binding during circuit-build time requires additional computation for generating and verify-
ing proofs, while including signatures in the SNIP (to be verified by clients at circuit build time)
requires additional bandwidth when transmitting the SNIP.
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Table 6.1: Tradeoffs: Telescoping, Single-Pass, Current Tor
 =achieved; #=not achieved; G#=partially achieved
3=performance property; †=security property
Telescop. Single-Pass Current Tor
3 Constant-size client download   #
3 One round trip per circuit built #  #
† Complete client control of relays selected G# #  
† Forward-secret relay selection  G#  
† Forward secrecy for data    
† Relays unaware of their positions in paths G# # G#
Batching Mechanisms for Path-Selection Keys
Note that the frequency at which a relay updates information in its SNIP impacts how often the
rest of the network is required to sync these updates; more frequent updates result in higher
bandwidth usage. As such, it is important to limit relay information churn where possible.
With this in mind, we note an optimization for Single-Pass Walking Onions to slow how
often relays update their path-selection keys in their SNIP while still rotating these keys once per
epoch. Instead of naively updating each relay’s SNIP every epoch with a new path-selection key,
relays can publish n path-selection keys to use for the next n epochs. Consequently, this batching
mechanism ensures the relay need to only update its SNIP every n network epochs to include
new key material, though it must still locally securely delete outdated private key material from
each prior epoch.
6.4 Tradeoffs Between Protocols
We now discuss the performance and security tradeoffs between Telescoping and Single-Pass
Walking Onions relative to the path-selection and circuit-construction protocols used by Tor
(further described in Section 2.2). We summarize these tradeoffs in Table 6.1.
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6.4.1 Performance Tradeoffs
We provide an in-depth analysis of the performance of the Walking Onions protocols in Chap-
ter 8, but summarize these tradeoffs here.
As Telescoping and Single-Pass Walking Onions do not require clients to maintain a network
directory document, both protocols offer improved performance over current Tor in bandwidth
and storage requirements for clients, as the number of relays increases. However, Telescoping
Walking Onions requires a quadratic number of messages and a linear number of round trips
from the client to construct a circuit relative to the number of hops in the circuit. As such,
Telescoping Walking Onions matches the message complexity of Tor for circuit construction.
Conversely, Single-Pass Walking Onions creates circuits with a linear number of messages and
a single round trip from the client, requiring less latency from a client’s perspective. However,
Single-Pass Walking Onions requires additional computation at each hop due to additional key-
blinding operations.
6.4.2 Security Tradeoffs
Telescoping Walking Onions offers partial client control over the selection of relays, as the client
can select only i but has no information about the relay, unlike current Tor. This tradeoff may
be consequential if the client maintains many path restrictions and thus requires more informa-
tion about relays during path selection (see Chapter 7 for more information on accommodating
complex path requirements). Telescoping Walking Onions provides the same levels of forward
secrecy as current Tor for client communication as well as the selection of relays for a path. Simi-
larly, Single-Pass Walking Onions provides complete forward secrecy for client communications,
but “windowed” forward secrecy for relay selection after a predetermined period after which re-
lays’ path-selection keys are rotated. Because fresh path-selection keys are generated for each
key rotation in Single-Pass Walking Onions, compromise of a past key will not impact the secu-
rity of paths outside of the window of time which the compromised key is used. Notably, Single-
Pass Walking Onions improves upon past single-pass circuit designs [KZG07,CFG09,ØS07] (as
further described in Section 3.2) by ensuring immediate forward secrecy for client communica-
tion.
Any relay in the first or last position of a circuit can learn its position from its incoming and
outgoing traffic. Consequently, in a three-hop path, relays occupying the middle position can
also learn their position by process of elimination. However, when paths are longer than three
hops, Single-Pass Walking Onions offers a slightly weaker property than Telescoping Walking
Onions or Vanilla Onion Routing, as Single-Pass Walking Onions exposes to each on-path relay
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its distance to the end of the path by revealing the TTL indicator θ. In practice, the ability for an
adversary to use this information is correlated to characteristics of the anonymity network.
6.5 Hybrid Walking Onions Protocol
While the Single-Pass Walking Onions protocol allows a client to optimistically build a new
circuit, a fallback mechanism is important when a client requires relays with specific properties.
For example, a client may require a relay to be in a specific geographic location (see Chapter 7
for more details on selecting relays weighted by some specific property in Walking Onions). To
support this case, a hybrid approach can be used, where instead of building the complete circuit
with Single-Pass Walking Onions, the client uses Single-Path Walking Onions only to select n−`
relays for the circuit, and then uses the Telescoping approach to specify the remaining ` relays.
With this approach, the client trades some of the performance benefit from Single-Pass Walking
Onions for additional control over the selection of the ` relays in which Telescoping is used to
extend the circuit.
6.6 Bootstrapping the First Connection
Walking Onions assumes clients have sufficient information to establish a connection to the first
hop in the path. This problem is not unique to Walking Onions; all anonymity networks require
that new clients have a mechanism to connect to the network. As such, anonymity networks using
Walking Onions have several options for clients to bootstrap. Here we describe two options,
but note that such bootstrapping is comparatively infrequent, as clients in networks like Tor fix
long-lived relays for this first position for up to four months at a time to prevent enumeration
attacks [Tor20b, EBA+12].
6.6.1 Building from trusted relays
Many anonymity networks, such as Tor, preconfigure a list of stable relays in the client software
as a bootstrapping mechanism [Mat20a,DM20]. These relays can be used to bootstrap in Walking
Onions as well. To bootstrap, clients can build a circuit using one of these pre-configured relays
as the first hop. After the circuit is complete, clients can extend this circuit to an additional
relay that is suitable to serve as the first hop for future circuits (we discuss how clients can
ensure the suitability of relays based on certain criteria in Chapter 7). The client can then throw
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away the circuit, building fresh circuits through this new first hop. This mechanism relies on the
same security assumptions as when sending traffic through multi-hop circuits; that is, the cost to
perform an end-to-end correlation between the client and the end destination is sufficiently high
to an attacker.
6.6.2 Private Information Retrieval
Using PIR for client bootstrapping in anonymity networks is well established in the literature (as
further described in Section 3.1.2), such as using a set of PIR servers to serve a subset of relay
information to Tor clients [MOT+11, SG19]. A similar approach can be used to bootstrap the
first hop of a circuit with Walking Onions. For example, the client software can include a set of
PIR servers, which clients can query to obtain one or more SNIPs to use as the first hop.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce two Walking Onions path-selection and circuit construction proto-
cols. Telescoping Walking Onions gives clients full control over selection of a random index that
the client uses to indicate the relay that their circuit should extend to, thereby building circuits
iteratively. Single-Pass Walking Onions allows intermediate relays to randomly select the next
hop in the path in such a way that the client can verify the randomness of this selection, and
consequently builds the circuit in a single pass. We compare the tradeoffs of these protocols to a
generalized onion-routing protocol and discuss how each protocol compares in terms of forward
secrecy, client control, and efficiency. We then introduce a hybrid variant between Telescoping
and Single-Pass Walking Onions and discuss settings when this variant may be a good option to
provide a measure of both client control and improved efficiency. We present several bootstrap-
ping mechanisms for the client to establish a secure connection to the first relay in their path, as
Walking Onions assumes a separate bootstrapping mechanism to learn information for the first
relay in their path.
Next, we examine how to build upon these protocols to allow clients more control over se-




Until this point, we have presented path-selection protocols that have not specified how to gener-
ate the distribution over which the client selects relays from the most recent ENDIVE. However,
clients often have more complex path requirements. For example, networks such as Tor weight
client’s selection of relays by bandwidth [Tor20d]. Further, many networks restrict which relays
can be selected for specific positions in a client’s path, such as Loopix-based networks, which
use a stratified topology. We now present several mechanisms to accommodate client path re-
quirements in Walking Onions, and discuss settings in which each mechanism is more or less
suitable.
In Section 7.1, we discuss the simplest approach that is appropriate when most relays are
expected to fulfill some property. In Section 7.2, we discuss how to encode multiple indices
into a SNIP to facilitate client selection over multiple properties. In Section 7.3, we introduce a
simple mechanism to group properties to limit the total number of selection choices. Finally, in
Section 7.4, we present an alternative encoding approach in which a relay’s support of a set of
properties can be encoded into a Merkle tree, and in Section 7.5, we introduce a simple protocol
such that one relay can verifiably recommend a better-suited relay to a client’s path requirements.
7.1 Optimistic Attempt and Discard
A simple approach that is acceptable when most relays support a given property is the attempt-
and-discard approach: the client builds a circuit randomly, and discards it if it is not suitable.
For an example, if a client wants a circuit whose final relay supports a common property, such as
forwarding traffic to port 80 (http), they can simply construct circuits optimistically, discarding
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those ending with relays that do not fulfill this property. However, if a client wants a less well-
supported port, such as port 25 (smtp), attempt-and-discard would be costly.
Note that this strategy could in theory be fingerprintable by an adversary watching the net-
work, as the number of attempts could leak the (weighted) prevalence of the client’s path require-
ment. However, in practice, the advantage for an adversary to deduce this information can be
bounded by ensuring that this strategy is used only for well-supported properties.
7.2 Separate index ranges
As discussed in Section 5.2, every SNIP is assigned a default index range by the network author-
ity. However, SNIPs may contain multiple index ranges, with each index range corresponding
to a separate (non-uniform) probability distribution that represents the relay’s fulfilment of some
property, such as a relay’s available bandwidth in the case of Tor. Such a weighted ranking can
be encoded into the index range assigned to each relay by the authority when generating the EN-
DIVE for the next epoch. When the client samples an index at random, the relays with a higher
weight will subsequently be more likely to be selected. If a relay does not fulfill a property, its
corresponding index range is empty. Note that representing properties by separate index ranges
requires the client to not only send an index i during circuit construction, but additionally an
identifier indicating which index range to use for relay selection.
One application of this approach includes the case of Tor, where relays can be segmented into
different “roles”, or positions on the path. With Walking Onions, properties can be represented
as a separate index range within a SNIP. We demonstrate this mechanism in an instantiation of
an example ENDIVE in Figure 7.1; each relay role is assigned a separate index range depending
on whether the relay fulfills a particular role. Specifically, in Tor, relays can be assigned roles
to serve as entry positions in a circuit, or volunteer to serve in the exit position; Figure 7.1
demonstrates these roles encoded into a SNIP. Further, the relay has a separate index range
specifically to determine this relay’s available bandwidth relative to the rest of the network.
To perform this selection, the client sends (ψ, i) to the last relay in the circuit Rn, where
ψ represents the client’s desired property and consequently indicating the index range that Rn
should use when selecting the next relay in the circuit Rn+1.
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This example ENDIVE has separate index ranges to support default indexing as well as per-
property ranges for exit or entry roles. For this example, α = 1024.
The ENDIVE data structure is boxed to represent how the timestamp and signature are prop-
erties of the ENDIVE, even though each SNIP in the ENDIVE also has its own timestamp
and signature.
Timestamp, Signature
ID Bandwidth Exit? Entry? Keys, etc Timestamp Signature
R1 0–127 0–255 0–511 ... ... ...
R2 128–383 256–767 ∅ ... ... ...
R3 384–895 ∅ ∅ ... ... ...
R4 896–1024 768–1024 512–1024 ... ... ...
Figure 7.1: Example ENDIVE
7.3 Grouping by Class
When the number of properties grows, however, representing each property as its own index
range results in a linear growth of the SNIP. For example, in Tor, relay operators can list ports
to which their relay will forward traffic exiting the network. If each index range is encoded as
8 bytes in a SNIP, representing 65,535 TCP ports as separate index ranges would increase each
SNIP’s size by 524.28 KB, a clearly inefficient approach. In this case, we can reduce the number
of properties by grouping exit ports into port classes. Two ports are in the same class if every
relay in the ENDIVE either allows both ports or denies both ports. In an analysis of a snapshot
of the current Tor network, we find that the 65,535 ports can be grouped into only 220 port
classes. Each property in the SNIP then corresponds to a port class. Furthermore, the designers
of an anonymity network can enforce the number of properties to be below some threshold by
restricting the flexibility of which combinations are allowed.
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7.4 Representing Properties in Merkle Trees
The strategy of using one index range to represent a class of properties in the SNIP still results in
linear growth relative to the number of properties represented in the SNIP. To address this issue,
and to keep the size of the SNIP independent of the number of properties, the authority need not
place the per-property index ranges directly into each SNIP. Instead, for each relay, the authority
can construct a Merkle tree whose leaves are the per-property index ranges for that relay, and
only encode the root of that tree into the relay’s SNIP. (The default index range for each relay,
not associated with a particular property, should always explicitly appear in the SNIP for reasons
we will see shortly.) To enable relays to construct proofs demonstrating that other relays fulfill a
specific property, the authority should additionally encode the properties each relay supports into
the ENDIVE for the network. Using each property and every SNIP in the ENDIVE, relays can
deterministically recompute the per-property index ranges locally to reproduce the Merkle trees
for each relay in the network.
With this approach, SNIPs remain constant sized as the number of properties grows, while
the bandwidth needed for circuit construction when specifying a particular required property
increases by the length of the Merkle proof, logarithmic in the number of properties.
7.5 Delegated Verifiable Selection
Sometimes, the client does not wish to reveal their required property ψ to an intermediate relay
Rn for the selection of a relay Rn+1. While this requirement could be supported by building
and discarding circuits until the user’s path requirements are met, such an approach is costly,
especially when a required property is not widely supported. We now discuss how to handle this
case using a technique we call Delegated Verifiable Selection.
Delegated Verifiable Selection uses an optimistic technique where a client attempts to build
a circuit to a relay Rn in the hopes that Rn fulfills some property ψ. However, if Rn does not
fulfill this desired property,Rn can recommend another relay that does fulfill ψ in such a way that
the client to remain oblivious to the selection process but can later verify that the recommended
relays does support ψ and that the selection process was not biased.
After extending a circuit to relay Rn, if the client requires Rn to fulfill a specific property ψ,
the client sends ψ to Rn through the circuit (thereby ensuring no intermediate relay can learn ψ).
If Rn supports ψ, the circuit extension to Rn is considered complete and usable. Otherwise, Rn
computes an index i∗ (taken modα) derived from the hash of the client’s messages to Rn so far
in the protocol. Relay Rn then selects the SNIP Σ whose index range for property ψ contains
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i∗. Rn replies to the client with Σ. Upon receiving the recommended relay represented by Σ, the
client will destroy the circuit and then build a fresh circuit using the relay corresponding to Σ in
the nth position. The client describes this relay using a new index i′ sampled from Σ’s default
index range, to avoid linkability with i∗.
Note that a limitation of this technique is it requires requires either Telescoping or Hybrid
Walking Onions to give the client complete control over specifying the extension to the relay
corresponding to their desired index i′.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present several techniques and protocols to facilitate Walking Onions path
selection and circuit extension protocols for more complex complex path requirements. We first
discuss the Attempt and Discard approach as a simple technique which—in the case that the
probability of selecting appropriate relays is high—requires clients to simply discard circuits
that do not meet the client’s path requirements. However, in settings where the probability of
selecting an appropriate relay is not as high, we discuss the technique of maintaining separate
index ranges in each SNIP. However, as this approach results in linear growth in the size of the
SNIP, we conclude this chapter by describing a technique using Merkle trees to encode a relay’s
support for a set of properties, as well as a protocol which one relay can verifiably recommend
to the client another relay better suited to the client’s path requirements.




We now compare the performance of Walking Onions protocols to that of an optimized version
of Tor that uses Vanilla Onion Routing as described in Section 6.1.4; we refer to this variant of
Tor as Idealized Tor. We compare Walking Onions and Idealized Tor on their bandwidth, CPU,
and latency cost to both relays and clients.
We summarize the notation used for our evaluation in Table 8.1. In Section 8.1, we present
Idealized Tor and its corresponding parameter choices. In Section 8.2, we compare the bandwidth
cost between Idealized Tor and Telescoping and Single-Pass Walking Onions. In Section 8.3,
we assess the latency cost of each protocol, and in Section 8.4 we derive CPU costs of each
protocol for both ENDIVE generation and validation as well as circuit construction overhead. In
Section 8.5 we compare Walking Onions designs to PIR-based designs with similar scalability
goals for anonymity networks.
All of the code used to validate the derived performance results in this thesis is available at
https://git.uwaterloo.ca/ckomlo/walking-onions-measurements.git.
8.1 Idealized Tor
Idealized Tor is a generalized and strictly more efficient design modeled after the real Tor net-
work; we leverage a generalized model to provide a useful frame of reference for a larger class
of anonymity networks that utilize onion routing protocols. By constructing this deliberately
underestimated model, we ensure that any protocol that performs better than Idealized Tor will
perform better than onion routing networks in practice.
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Idealized Tor requires all participants download relay information once per epoch as such
information changes, and bootstrapping requires all clients and relays to download information
about all relays in the network. When relay information changes, Idealized Tor assumes that
clients and relays update only the information that has changed. However, Idealized Tor ignores
overhead incurred in practice for data requests such as packet headers or padding. Further, we
assume the bare minimum of relay information, and do not include fields required in practice in
Tor such as exit policies.
We provide more detail on the estimated numbers for Idealized Tor in Table 8.1.
How Idealized is Idealized Tor? We use the same network size and rate of relay information
for Idealized Tor as today’s Tor network (as further described below in Section 8.2.4). However,
because our models for Idealized Tor do not account for overhead of transmitting data in prac-
tice, such as document headers, and only account for a minimum subset of relay information,
the cost to transmit network directory documents is underestimated for Idealized Tor in compar-
ison to the real Tor network. Our measurements show that a Tor client requires approximately
2.49 megabytes of data to bootstrap and 48 kilobytes to sync updated directory information each
epoch. For the same network size, Tor relays require 10.3 megabytes of data to bootstrap and
608 kilobytes of updated network directory information to sync every network epoch. In com-
parison, our model for Idealized Tor requires both clients and relays to download 832 kilobytes
of directory information upon bootstrapping to the network, and 158 kilobytes to sync updated
directory information for each subsequent epoch.
8.2 Bandwidth Analysis
We now compare the cost in bandwidth required by Idealized Tor and Telescoping and Single-
Pass Walking Onions. We assess the derived costs for distributing network directory documents
in Section 8.2.1 and the derived cost of circuit construction in Section 8.2.2. We review the
growth rates of each protocol in Section 8.2.3 and finally perform a comparison in real numbers
and assess the total bandwidth costs in Section 8.2.4.
8.2.1 Distributing Network Directory Documents
We now evaluate the cost of maintaining network state for Idealized Tor and Telescoping and
Single-Pass Walking Onions; we summarize our findings in Table 8.2.
We represent the number of relays in the anonymity network by NR. In Idealized Tor, the
information distributed to the network about each relay—termed a relay entry—is BR in size;
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Table 8.1: Notation and Estimated Values in a Tor-like network
Notation used in our performance assessment, and their estimated values based on a
simplification of Tor ignoring implementation details such as legacy protocols and padding.
Notation Description Estimated value
NR Number of relays on the network –
NC Number of clients on the network –
NH Number of hops in a circuit path 3
NV Number of trusted voters constituting the network
authority
–
BR Size of a relay entry 128 bytes
BO Additional fields needed for a SNIP 32 bytes
BAUTH (thresh-
old signatures)
Authentication tag size per SNIP 76 bytes
BAUTH (Merkle
proofs)
Authentication tag size per SNIP 32dlgNRe bytes
BSNIP (thresh-
old signatures)
Total size of a SNIP = BR +BO +BAUTH 236 bytes
BSNIP (Merkle
proofs)
Total size of a SNIP = BR +BO +BAUTH 160 + 32dlgNRe bytes
BID Size of node identifier (used in Vanilla Onion
Routing)
66 bytes
BIDX Size of ENDIVE index (used in Walking Onions) 8 bytes
BT Size of a TTL field (used in Single-Pass) 1 byte
BV Size of a VRF output and proof (used in Single-
Pass)
80 bytes
BE Size of authenticated encryption overhead 28 bytes
BC Size of circuit handshake request 32 bytes
BS Size of circuit handshake response 64 bytes
P∆ Fraction of relay information changed per epoch 1.9%
γ Circuits per client per epoch 8.9
φ 0 if using Merkle proofs; 1 otherwise. Reflects if
relays must download authentication information
for each SNIP; see Section 5.3.)
–
68
Table 8.2: Bandwidth Costs
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this information changes in each epoch with probability P∆. The bandwidth cost for both clients
and relays to bootstrap in Idealized Tor is NRBR, or the size of the network directory document.
Both clients and relays keep their copy of the network directory document up to date by fetching
updated relay information, which is equal to the size of the relay entries that change per epoch,
or NRBRP∆. We denote the number of clients as NC , and we assume each relay serves network
directory documents to an equal fraction of clients. Consequently, the cost in bandwidth to each






Now consider Walking Onions. We assume each SNIP contains the same amountBR of relay
information as a relay entry. Additional fields required by the SNIP, such as index ranges (as
described in Section 5.2), are represented by BO. The size of authentication information for each
SNIP is represented byBAUTH . The mechanism for authentication influences the size ofBAUTH ;
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the size of threshold or one-per-voter signatures remains constant regardless of the size of the
network NR, but the size of each Merkle proof grows logarithmically relative to the number of
relays dlgNRe, as further described in Section 5.3. We indicate the mechanism for authentication
using a flag φ. The total size of the SNIP is denoted as BSNIP = BR +BO +BAUTH .
Bandwidth cost to relays. Relays in Walking Onions must maintain an up-to-date network
directory document, although they do not serve these documents to clients. Each epoch, relays
will download SNIPs that have changed. Note that the choice of authentication mechanism
impacts the frequency of SNIP updates, as further discussed in Section 5.3. Consequently, relays
download a total of NR(BR +BO)P∆ + φNRBAUTH bytes each epoch.
Bandwidth cost to clients. Because clients to not require maintaining information about
all relays in the network, there is no bandwidth cost for clients in Walking Onions to fetch
network directory documents. We do not here consider infrequent, out-of-band bootstrapping
mechanisms for clients to learn a subset of the relays, as described in Section 6.6.
8.2.2 Circuit Construction
We now describe how Idealized Tor compares to Telescoping and Single-Pass Walking Onions
in bandwidth cost for circuit establishment. We summarize these results in Table 8.2.
Bandwidth cost to clients. In Idealized Tor, clients send a node identifier of size BID to
identify the next relay the circuit should extend to. The size of the client’s circuit extension
request is represented as BC , and the size of the relay’s response as BS . To build an NH-hop
circuit in Idealized Tor, the client’s total bandwidth is (NH − 1)BID + NH(BC + BS). The
coefficient (NH − 1) corresponds to the client not sending the node identifier when establishing
the first hop in the circuit.1
For Telescoping Walking Onions, the client’s total bandwidth for circuit construction is
(NH − 1)(BIDX + BSNIP ) + NH(BC + BS). The client sends an index of size BIDX to select
the next hop, and receives a SNIP in return. For Single-Pass Walking Onions, the client’s total
bandwidth for circuit construction is similar, totalling 2BC +BT +NHBS + (NH − 1)(BSNIP +
BV + BE). We estimate the size of the path-selection and circuit public keys to each be BC
bytes in size; hence a client’s cost to initialize Single-Pass Walking Onions is 2BC + BT , where
BT represents the TTL value the client sends to indicate the path length. Clients in Single-Pass
Walking Onions receive NHBS + (NH − 1)(BSNIP + BV + BE) bytes in response; BV rep-
resents the size of the VRF proof, and BE represents the authenticated encryption overhead for
1Our calculations ignore the effect of message padding for simplicity, although this is often required in a live
anonymity network.
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the response. Note that with Single-Pass Walking Onions, the size of additional fields in a SNIP
BAUTH also includes each relay’s public path-selection keys, and hence will slightly larger than
in Telescoping.
Bandwidth cost to relays. We measure the total bandwidth cost to construct a single circuit
for all relays in the circuit as the number of bytes sent and received. Note that when NH >
1, some handshake messages must be relayed by all intermediate hops on the circuit. With
this in mind, we estimate the total bandwidth cost for all relays in a circuit in Idealized Tor as∑NH−1
j=1 (2j − 1)BID +
∑NH
j=1(2j − 1)(BC + BS) = (NH − 1)2BID + NH
2(BC + BS). For
Telescoping Walking Onions, the total bandwidth is NH2(BIDX + BC + BS + BSNIP ), while
for Single-Pass Walking Onions, the total bandwidth cost is (2NH − 1)(2BC +BT ) +N2HBS +
(NH − 1)2(BSNIP +BV +BE).
8.2.3 Analysis of Growth Rates
We now discuss the growth rates and performance implications of each protocol as the network
grows large.
In Telescoping Walking Onions, clients begin to save bandwidth over Idealized Tor when
NR
γ
> σ = NH−1
BRP∆
(BIDX + BSNIP − BID) — in other words, when the number of relays is
high relative to the number of circuits that each client creates in an epoch. Regardless of the
authentication mechanism, the left side of the equation quickly overtakes the right as NR grows.
Because σ is a constant independent of the size of the network when threshold or one-per-voter
signatures are employed, and grows at rate dlgNRe when using Merkle proofs, the growth rate
of the NR term still outweighs the growth of BSNIP .
For overall bandwidth usage (clients plus relays), Telescoping Walking Onions outperforms
Idealized Tor in bandwidth cost for relays whenNR [(MBR −BO)P∆ − φBAUTH ] > γM(NH−
1)2(BIDX +BSNIP −BID), assuming each relay handles γNC NHNR circuits per epoch, and M =
NC
NR
is the ratio of clients to relays. Again in this equation, [(MBR − BO)P∆ − φBAUTH ] is a
constant term independent of network growth, and the term γM(NH − 1)2(BIDX + BSNIP −
BID) represents the amount of data relays sent during circuit creation, whose growth is at most
logarithmic relative to NR when Merkle proofs are used. Therefore, the left side will again
dominate as NR grows.
The calculation for Single-Pass Walking Onions is similar. Note that while Single-Pass Walk-
ing Onions incurs slightly higher bandwidth overhead for smaller network sizes, it converges to
that of Telescoping Walking Onions for networks of larger sizes. Because Single-Pass Walking
Onions requires slightly larger SNIPs due to the VRF path-selection keys, and transmits slightly
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more data during circuit construction due to the VRF proofs, this overhead is distinguishable for
smaller networks but is quickly dominated by other factors for larger networks.
8.2.4 Comparing Total Bandwidth Costs
Does Walking Onions save bandwidth in comparison to Idealized Tor? We experiment how
Walking Onions protocols compare to Idealized Tor using estimated values presented in Ta-
ble 8.1 and our bandwidth formulas from Table 8.2. We start by describing our methodology for
instantiating actual paramaeters for Idealized Tor, and then present our results.
Recall that these estimates for Tor’s directory protocol are significantly more efficient than
the real Tor network, as discussed in Section 8.1.
Parameters for Idealized Tor
We first give more detail about our methodology for determining parameters for Idealized Tor.
Network size and client behaviour. We obtain our estimates of the current number of relays
NR = 6, 500 and clients NC = 2, 500, 000 from Tor’s metrics site [Tor19a, Tor19b] as of 28
July 2019, rounding to two significant digits. We maintain this ratio of clients to relays, but
experiment with different scaling factors. We compute the number of circuits γ each client
makes per epoch by noting that Tor nodes log the total number of circuits they help create every
six hours. We gathered 24 hours of these logs from a Tor exit node, and divided by the node’s
exit probability to estimate that the Tor network as a whole creates 536 million circuits per
day, or 22 million per epoch.2 Dividing by NC yields γ = 8.9 for today’s Tor network. We also
experiment with a future anonymity network with increased utilization by assessing performance
when γ = 89.
Tor circuits are usually NH = 3 hops long.
Rate of network change. We estimate the current rate of change in Tor network informa-
tion by an experiment in which we instrumented a Tor client to bootstrap and maintain a fully
up-to-date directory for 24 hours, and to record the (compressed) bandwidth it used in doing
so. Comparing the average hourly download size to the amount of information downloaded at
bootstrap, we obtained an estimate of P∆ = 1.9%.
Cryptographic size assumptions. We assume the use of elliptic-curve public keys that can
be represented in 32 bytes, such as Curve25519 [LHT16], and whose signatures are of size
2This computation only counts circuits with an exit node, and not, for example, onion service circuits, but onion
services are only about 1% of Tor’s traffic. [Tor20c]
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64 bytes. Furthermore, we assume hashing operations produce a digest of size 32 bytes. Au-
thenticated encryption (for example, AES-GCM) requires BE = 28 bytes for the nonce and
authentication tag in total. We assume the use of the IETF-proposed VRF [GRPV19], which has
a BV = 80 byte output, including the proof.
Directory information. We calculate the number of bytes BR needed to represent a relay
as follows: identity public key (32 bytes), onion public key (32 bytes), IPv4 address (4 bytes),
IPv6 address (16 bytes), exit policy digest (32 bytes), supported bandwidth (4 bytes), and us-
age/protocol flags (8 bytes). We represent this sum asBR, totaling 128 bytes. Note, as mentioned
in Section 8, we model Idealized Tor as a significantly more efficient onion routing network than
existing Tor, as an underestimation of onion-routing networks in practice.
Circuit Extension Calculation. The Vanilla Onion Routing handshake (based on Tor’s ntor)
requires that the client send an ephemeral public key; the relay replies with an ephemeral public
key and an authentication tag. These values make the request and response costs (BC and BS)
32 and 64 bytes respectively.
To identify a particular relay, Tor clients send an IPv4 address and port (6 bytes), a 20-byte
identity digest, 8 bytes of headers, and a 32-byte public key that they believe the relay has. This
makes BID = 66 bytes. An index, on the other hand, would be represented with 4 bytes of index
and 4 bytes of headers, for a total of BIDX = 8 bytes. Time-to-live fields θ are BT = 1 byte.
SNIP size. We assume that Tor will need four separate indices for its routing: one for each of
the Guard, Middle, and Exit positions, and one for Onion Service directories. Each index range
on a SNIP would take 8 bytes (4 bytes for the start of the range, and 4 bytes for the end). This
gives us a total SNIP overhead of BO = 4 · 8 bytes. We can represent the SNIP’s validity period
with 12 bytes (8 for the starting time, and 4 for its duration in seconds), and use a further 64
bytes for a signature.
We present threshold signatures and Merkle proofs for SNIP authentication in Section 5.3.
With threshold signatures we have timestamped signatures of BAUTH = 64 + 12 bytes (64 bytes
for signature, 8 for start time, 4 for duration); with Merkle proofs we have BAUTH = 32dlgNRe
bytes. (A single authentication tag exists, and is fetched once per epoch as negligible overhead.)
Results
We present our complete results in Figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4, but summarize our findings
here.
Total cost to clients. As demonstrated in Figure 8.1, clients in Walking Onions benefit
in reduced bandwidth costs over Idealized Tor at any network size larger than the current Tor
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Figure 8.1: Client Bandwidth Utilization, for γ = 8.9
Crossover point (when γ = 8.9) where Walking Onions demonstrates client bandwidth savings
as compared to Idealized Tor. The approximate number of relays in today’s Tor network is
indicated by the black vertical line. (M) denotes Merkle Signatures; (T) represents Threshold
Signatures.
network (and even for somewhat smaller networks as well), when the average number of circuits
γ created per client per epoch and the ratio of clients to relays are close to that of today’s Tor.
Further, while the cost in bandwidth to clients using Idealized Tor grows linearly relative to
the number of relays, the cost to clients using Walking Onions instantiated with Merkle proofs
grows logarithmically. Clients using Walking Onions instantiated with threshold signatures do
not experience any growth in bandwidth as the number of relays increases.
Specifically, our measurements presented in Figure 8.1 indicate that Walking Onions outper-
forms Idealized Tor using Vanilla Onion Routing for clients when the network is of size between
1,300 and 4,800, depending on which protocol variant of Walking Onions is used and authenti-
cation method. The crossover of clients in Telescoping Walking Onions is at 1,300 relays when
using threshold signatures and 3,500 relays when using Merkle proofs. For clients using Single-
Pass Walking Onions, the crossover point is at 2,000 Relays when using threshold signatures and
4,700 when using Merkle proofs.
As such, all variants of Walking Onions provide bandwidth savings to clients in networks the
size of today’s Tor network, and this bandwidth savings increases as the network grows.
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Figure 8.2: Relay Bandwidth Utilization, for γ = 8.9
Crossover point (when γ = 8.9) where Walking Onions demonstrates relay bandwidth savings
as compared to Idealized Tor. The approximate number of relays in today’s Tor network is
indicated by the black vertical line. (M) denotes Merkle Signatures; (T) represents Threshold
Signatures.
Total cost to relays. Estimating relay bandwidth savings follows a similar trend, as demon-
strated in Figure 8.2. For relays, the bandwidth benefit of Walking Onions over Idealized Tor
similarly increases as the size of the network increases. We find that for Tor’s current γ, the
crossover point for relays (the size of a network above which Walking Onions is more bandwidth
efficient) is either below, or within a factor of 2, of the current Tor network size. While relays
must use more bandwidth in circuit construction in Walking Onions than in Idealized Tor, as the
numbers of clients and relays increase, relays save in bandwidth in Walking Onions due to the
savings of not transmitting network directory documents to clients in every epoch. Consequently,
while the rates of growth in bandwidth for relays remain linear for Walking Onions as in Ideal-
ized Tor, the bandwidth cost of Walking Onions to relays grows at a smaller factor as compared
to Idealized Tor.
We expect Walking Onions to offer better performance for relays when the network size
is between 2,900 and 10,000 relays, again depending on choice of protocol and authentication
method.
When comparing Telescoping and Single-Pass Walking Onions, we find that Single-Pass has
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Figure 8.3: Client Bandwidth Utilization, for γ = 89
Crossover point (when γ = 89) where Walking Onions demonstrates client bandwidth savings
as compared to Idealized Tor. The approximate number of relays in today’s Tor network is
indicated by the black vertical line. (M) denotes Merkle Signatures; (T) represents Threshold
Signatures.
slightly higher bandwidth costs than Telescoping due to transmitting additional key material for
the VRF. However, Single-Pass trades this bandwidth for improved latency, as we discuss in
Section 8.3.
Performance under Higher Utilization. As seen in Figures 8.3 and 8.4, we also experiment
with different network utilization levels by increasing the circuit construction rate γ. Assuming
a higher γ, bandwidth savings for clients in Walking Onions outperforms Idealized Tor using
Vanilla Onion routing when the network grows large. At a higher γ, bandwidth savings for
relays in Walking Onions utilizing threshold signatures is more efficient for networks of smaller
size. However, if the number of relays in the network is sufficiently large relative to γ, then
Merkle proof authentication becomes a strong benefit for relays, at a slight cost to clients.
8.3 Latency Evaluation
The primary savings we expect for Single-Pass Walking Onions over Telescoping or Idealized
Tor is in the reduced latency experienced by clients during circuit construction. The improve-
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Figure 8.4: Relay Bandwidth Utilization, for γ = 89
Crossover point (when γ = 89) where Walking Onions demonstrates relay bandwidth savings
as compared to Idealized Tor. The approximate number of relays in today’s Tor network is
indicated by the black vertical line. (M) denotes Merkle Signatures; (T) represents Threshold
Signatures.
ment of Single-Pass Walking Onions is the same as that of other single-pass circuit construction
proposals: whereas Idealized Tor and Telescoping both require a total of NH(NH + 1) messages
before the circuit can be constructed, Single-Pass Walking Onions requires only 2NH .
For clients with high-latency connections, the expected benefit is even greater: the number
of messages sent and received by the client over their local link is just 2 in Single-Pass Walking
Onions, as opposed to 2NH in Telescoping or Idealized Tor.
8.4 CPU Evaluation
We now evaluate the CPU cost for circuit extension as well as the cost in CPU and memory
of generating and validating ENDIVEs. We do not consider the CPU overhead for clients and
relays to download and validate network directory documents, as circuit-related operations will
dominate for workloads modelled after a live network in production.3 Finally, we evaluate only
3In a live network, the total number of circuits created by clients will typically far exceed the number of relays.
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Table 8.3: Number of group operations to construct a circuit.









Single-Pass WO 3 (last relay); 9 (other relays)
public-key group operations, and assume the overhead for symmetric-key and hashing operations
is negligible in comparison.
We summarize our analysis for circuit extension in Table 8.3 and ENDIVE generation and
validation in Table 8.4.
8.4.1 CPU Cost to Extend a Circuit
For specificity, we instantiate the generic authenticated key exchange and VRF functions from
Section 6 with ntor [GSU12], requiring two public key operations for both clients and relays, and
the IETF-proposed VRF [GRPV19], which requires three each.
Notably, Telescoping Walking Onions incurs the same number of group operations for both
clients and relays participating in a circuit extension as Idealized Tor. For Single-Pass Walking
Onions, additional group operations are required for the blinding and VRF computations.
As described in Table 8.4, the cost to the client to validate SNIPs after each circuit extension
depends on the type of signature included within the SNIP. One point to note is that certain
signatures allow for batch processing, allowing the client to jointly verify all SNIPs in Single-
Pass Walking Onions; we do not account for this optimization in the above table.
8.4.2 CPU Cost for ENDIVE Generation and Validation
In Section 5.3, we present several mechanisms as options for performing SNIP and ENDIVE au-
thentication by the network authority; we now evaluate the performance in CPU of these options
here.
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Table 8.4: Costs of ENDIVE Generation, Signature Storage
CPU cost measured in public-key operations, signature size measured in bytes.
Cost to generate (per
voter, per ENDIVE)







NR NV NV signatures
Merkle
proof
1 0 dlgNRe digests
Threshold signature NR 1 1 signature
The most costly signature to both generate, validate, and store is the One-Per-Voter approach,
in which each SNIP is signed individually by each of NV voters. Note that the cost to each voter
grows linearly with the number of relays, and the cost to clients grows linearly with the number
of voters.
Merkle proofs are smaller than threshold signatures or the One-Per-Voter approach when
considering the cost to transmit an ENDIVE, as only a single root hash need be authenticated
and encoded in the ENDIVE; relays will recompute the Merkle proof on receipt of the ENDIVE
to verify the root hash. Furthermore, clients perform fewer public-key operations during SNIP
validation, as the Merkle root can be validated just once per epoch when the client receives
and authenticates a network parameters document. After this step, validation of SNIPs requires
clients to only use hashing operations to validate the Merkle proof to demonstrate inclusion of
the SNIP in the ENDIVE.
Threshold signatures provide an attractive option as the cost to validate a threshold signature
is a single public-key operation for clients, while the size of the signature remains constant even
as the number of voters attesting to the integrity of the SNIP grows. However, the total cost to
a single voter to generate a threshold signature for each SNIP scales linearly in the number of
relays.
8.5 Comparisons to Other Designs
We now compare the scalability of Walking Onions to PIR-based designs with similar goals to
improve the scalability of anonymity networks such as Tor. We include in our analysis PIR-
Tor [MOT+11] instantiated with both Computational PIR (C-PIR) and Information-Theoretic
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PIR (IT-PIR) designs, as well as ConsenSGX [SG19], which relies on trusted hardware. Recall
that we expand on the design and security and efficiency tradeoffs of each of these designs in
Section 3.1.2.
We assume clients request guard node information via an out-of-band mechanism. However,
each additional relay role requires a separate PIR database. Consequently, PIR-Tor using C-PIR
requires two PIR queries per circuit, as does ConsenSGX. We assume an optimization for PIR-
Tor using IT-PIR [MOT+11] in which the client performs PIR queries for only the exit node. We
furthermore assume that PIR queries can be performed in batch, such that one client request can
contain multiple PIR queries.
Bandwidth cost. While PIR-based designs require performing at minimum one PIR query
per circuit, Walking Onions requires transmitting the SNIP for each relay during circuit estab-
lishment. While the overhead for each PIR design will vary, the bandwidth overhead for Walking
Onions will not be greater than C-PIR or IT-PIR based designs, as each design requires the client
to perform at minimum one PIR query for each new circuit. For PIR designs based on trusted
hardware, Walking Onions queries will be slightly larger as SNIPs contain the index ranges
(Section 5.2) not required by these PIR designs. (The PIR designs still require the per-entry
authentication tags and validity time fields, however.)
Computational cost. While the CPU cost per circuit construction in Walking Onions re-
mains constant for clients and effectively constant (there may be a binary search to look up the
next relay whose SNIP contains the requested index) for relays as the network scales, a server
performing IT-PIR or C-PIR must perform work linear in the number of relays. As such, even if
the computational cost of these PIR schemes were acceptable today in a network the current size
of the Tor network, the cost for these designs increases as the network scales, unlike Walking
Onions. Note that the computational cost for ConsenSGX similarly remains constant relative to
the number of relays.
Summary. IT-PIR and C-PIR based schemes scale sublinearly for client bandwidth usage
as the size of the network grows, while the cost to clients in Walking Onions remains constant.
Further, for IT-PIR and C-PIR schemes, server computation scales linearly relative to the network
size. Although ConsenSGX has similar performance benefits to Walking Onions, the dependence
of ConsenSGX on trusted hardware is undesirable to many real-world security-critical projects.
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present a performance evaluation for Walking Onions against an idealized
version of path-selection and circuit-establishment protocols in Tor. We review high-level as
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well as derived bandwidth evaluations using a model of the Tor network as our case study. We
determine that the crossover point in which Walking Onions demonstrates bandwidth savings to
both clients and relays over Idealized Tor is at network sizes comparable to today’s Tor network.
We present a comparison of the cost in CPU between Walking Onions and Idealized Tor,
and discuss how different authentication mechanisms impact the resulting CPU and bandwidth
efficiency of these protocols. Further, we compare the performance cost of Walking Onions to
other designs with similar goals based on Private Information Retrieval, and discuss the security
and complexity tradeoffs of these designs.
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Chapter 9
Applications of Walking Onions
Throughout this work, we have used Tor as a case study to demonstrate how Walking Onions
can be used by anonymity networks with similar threat models and scalability concerns, and
whose designs build upon source-based onion routing constructions. However, demonstrating
more widespread applicability of Walking Onions is not only important, but possible due to the
generality of the protocols and techniques presented in this work.
In this chapter, we will discuss applications of Walking Onions to other anonymity network
designs to demonstrate the generality of Walking Onions beyond Tor. In Section 9.1 we discuss
how Walking Onions can be applied to HORNET, a high-performance onion-routing protocol
proposed in the literature. In Section 9.2, we outline how Walking Onions techniques can be in-
corporated into Lightning, a set of privacy and performance-enhancing protocols for the Bitcoin
network. Finally, in Section 9.3, we present several options for incorporating Walking Onions
into anonymity networks implementing the Loopix mix network design.
9.1 Applying Walking Onions to HORNET
HORNET [CAB+15] presents an onion-routing protocol that is optimized for performance and
is stateless for intermediate nodes in a path. Messages sent through the network are encrypted to
each hop in such a way that intermediate hops need only to persist a symmetric key for decrypting
packets. Once decrypted, packet headers include all information the node requires for processing
the onion-encrypted packet, including routing information and the node’s shared symmetric key
with the client. The protocol requires a one-time setup phase in which the circuit is established
in a single pass using a variant of Sphinx [DG09].
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While HORNET is optimized for performance, HORNET makes tradeoffs in security and
assumptions of additional infrastructure that may prove undesirable in practice. We will now
discuss how the use of Walking Onions in HORNET addresses two such cases.
First, HORNET assumes the existence of a safe mechanism for distributing path information
to the client, requiring that paths selected by clients are fully formed (i.e, clients select entire
paths, not individual relays to make up a path) and short, to improve performance over free-
routed networks. However, in practice, some anonymity networks may seek to achieve the best
of both worlds, to leverage the efficient packet structure and packet transmission techniques
presented in HORNET while allowing clients to enjoy as much anonymity as that of a free-
routed network such as Tor. As such, Walking Onions can be incorporated into networks utilizing
HORNET to achieve efficient distribution of network information and path selection, thereby
achieving this best-of-both-worlds approach.
Second, in order to establish a circuit in a single pass, HORNET currently requires the client
to use the long-lived public key for each node in a path in order to encrypt data to this hop in the
setup phase. While a variant of HORNET allows the node to use an ephemeral key to establish
the secret to encrypt client communication, HORNET is not forward-secure for the selection
of nodes in a path in either variant. Consequently, an adversary who compromises the node’s
long-lived key can recover the routing information exposed to this node. Applying Single-Pass
Walking Onions to HORNET improves security of path selection to be eventually forward-secure
after a window of time, while retaining the efficiency of establishing a circuit in a single pass.
Because nodes in the Single-Pass Walking Onions periodically rotate their keys used to set up
the circuit, path selection is eventually forward secure without requiring the client to perform an
update of more-recently published network directory information.
9.2 Applying Walking Onions to Lightning
The Lightning Network protocol [Osu16, Lig19] is a proposed network upgrade to the Bitcoin
network to provide improved scalability. However, in addition to proposing scalability improve-
ments, the protocol also includes an onion-routing protocol to improve network privacy. The
proposed protocol is source-routed, such that nodes select paths using their own local knowl-
edge of the network (which may be inconsistent with the views of other nodes, similarly to any
completely decentralized network), and messages are sent in a format modeled after the Sphinx
message format.
The Lightning protocol currently is based on a single-pass design where the initiator creates a
fresh ephemeral key for each circuit, and establishes a shared key using each relay’s static public
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key. In contrast, Single-Pass Walking Onions offers a drop-in replacement option with improved
security properties, as communication in Single-Pass remains forward secure.
Unlike in Tor, the Bitcoin network does not have a central PKI; currently, nodes use informa-
tion that is gossiped to them about other relays without having a reliable mechanism to ensure
the validity of this information. As such, designing an “authority” for a completely decentralized
network such as the Bitcoin network must employ a different network authority strategy. One
option for designing an appropriate authority for a completely decentralized network includes
a heuristic-based approach based on the information exchanged in the underlying gossip proto-
col. For example, a node that has received gossip information from a node that only recently
joined the network could be weighted as less reliable as opposed to information received from a
longer-lived node.
An important point to note when considering the use of Walking Onions in a fully decen-
tralized network is how each relay’s network view impacts the client’s path selection, as the
selection of a relay for the next hop in the Walking Onions design is impacted by the size of the
local routing table held by each relay. In a network where the view of a relay can be influenced
by its peers (such as by propagating false gossip messages or refusing to relay gossip messages),
this effect will also influence the security of path selection in Walking Onions.
9.3 Applying Walking Onions to Loopix-Based Mixnets
Loopix [PHE+17] is a mix network design that injects message delays and dummy messages to
hide a message’s path from source to destination against a global adversary. The frequency of
these message delays and dummy packets are chosen from a Poisson distribution, instead of per-
forming global coordination for mixing, as was common in earlier mix network designs [Cha81,
KEB98, BFK01].
Notably, the Loopix design assumes a PKI, ensuring that clients can be assured of the iden-
tity and corresponding public keys for mix servers in the network. Further, Loopix requires the
network to be horizontally stratified, such that a user building a path will select one server from
each layer. This design approach entails the client’s path is as long as the number of horizon-
tal layers in the network. Loopix assumes all users build paths with equal probability through
any mix server within a single layer. Consequently, because Loopix is also source-routed, the
client selects the path for their message to take from the complete set of all mix servers. As
such, Loopix assumes that clients maintain an up-to-date network directory document that is
authenticated using some authority mechanism.
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Currently, mix servers in Loopix send messages statelessly, using the Sphinx packet format
such that private symmetric keys encrypting each layer over the message are encrypted to each
node’s public key, and then included in the packet itself. When each node receives a packet, it
first uses its corresponding private key to decrypt its symmetric key, and then uses this symmetric
key to unwrap one layer of encryption of the message. The node then processes the message
headers which include instructions from the client such as the amount of delay to wait before
forwarding the message and information for the next relay int he path. Consequently, this design
is not forward secure for client communication due to the use of a relay’s static keys to encrypt
message keys for each packet during transmission.
Because Walking Onions requires a circuit setup phase between clients and relays, and sends
a stream of messages between client and destination using this circuit, implementing Walk-
ing Onions in a Loopix-based mix network system requires trading the efficiency of stateless
message-based architecture for improved scalability and forward secrecy of client communi-
cation. The resulting design would become a hybrid between mix network design and onion
routing, by utilizing longer-lived fixed circuits for message transmission between two parties,
but injecting message delays and dummy packets for frustrating a global adversary.
9.4 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce three additional case studies where Walking Onions can offer secu-
rity and performance improvements to anonymity network designs other than Tor. We introduce
HORNET and describe how Walking Onions can be incorporated into the design, so long as the
design can support freely routed path selection. We then introduce the Lightning onion-routing
protocol whose design is intended to improve network privacy in Bitcoin, and describe how the
use of Single-Pass Walking Onions can improve the forward-secrecy of communication in this
design. We note how the security tradeoffs of completely decentralized networks such as Bit-
coin similarly impacts the security guarantees offered by Walking Onions. Finally, we review
how Loopix-based networks can incorporate Walking Onions, so long as the network can sup-





To provide privacy to everyone on the Internet, anonymity networks must be able to accommo-
date hundreds of millions, if not billions, of users. To reach these numbers, today’s anonymity
networks must adopt more efficient protocols.
As a step towards this goal, we aimed to demonstrate the positive conclusion for the following
hypothesis:
It is possible to design an anonymity network whose clients maintain a constant amount
of network information even as the network grows, and can build circuits through the network
that require a linear number of messages relative to the length of the circuit. Furthermore, it
is possible that an anonymity network with such a design can remain secure against epistemic
and path-based attacks that previously have only been ameliorated by designs that require all
participants to retain a globally consistent view of the network.
As demonstrated in this work, we can conclude with a positive affirmation of the above hy-
pothesis. As evidence towards this conclusion, we present Walking Onions, a set of protocols to
remove the per-relay cost to clients in bandwidth and memory as the number of relays grows, and
to reduce the latency for new circuit construction. Notably, our protocols offer the same security
against route capture and epistemic attacks as prior work requiring a global consistent network
view. We present mechanisms to safely offload path selection from clients to intermediate re-
lays in the client’s circuit—even when the client maintains more complex path requirements—
without requiring the client to download the full consensus. We evaluate these protocols in terms
of bandwidth and CPU relative to a generic onion-routing protocol. Overall, we demonstrate that
Walking Onions presents compelling scalability improvements to anonymity networks, allowing
such networks to scale while maintaining constant-size bandwidth and memory requirements for
network information downloaded by users.
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